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EXPOSING SECRET SEARCHES: A FIRST AMENDMENT 




Abstract: Although, as a rule, court proceedings and judicial records are presumptively 
open to the public, electronic surveillance documents are exceptions. Like ordinary search 
warrants, surveillance applications are considered ex parte. But court orders frequently 
remain sealed indefinitely, even when there is no basis for continued secrecy. Indeed, 
secrecy—in the form of gag orders, local judicial rules, and even clerical filing and docketing 
practices—is built into the laws that regulate electronic surveillance. 
This Article argues that this widespread secrecy violates the First Amendment right of 
access to court proceedings and documents. The history of search and seizure shows that, far 
from requiring secrecy, searches and seizures were historically executed in public, with 
neighbors watching and even participating. Secrecy surrounding searches and seizures is a 
relatively new development, linked to the emergence of communications technology and 
laws governing the acquisition of customer records from third-party service providers. 
Transparency would play an especially positive role in this context because electronic 
surveillance is otherwise virtually insulated from public scrutiny: basic information about the 
scope of the government’s authority to conduct surveillance and data regarding the frequency 
with which it does so is largely unavailable to the public. Sealing also obscures the 
government’s interpretations of its own legal authority, as well as information about law 
enforcement technologies. 
These twin arguments—historical and logical—establish a basis for courts to recognize 
that a First Amendment right of access attaches to surveillance materials after an 
investigation has concluded. While the government may have a compelling need for secrecy 
of surveillance materials in ongoing investigations, there is no government interest 
sufficiently compelling to warrant the sealing of tens of thousands of judicial documents long 
after an investigation has concluded. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Every year, the government files thousands of ex parte applications 
seeking orders compelling communications service providers like 
Verizon, Sprint, AT&T, Facebook, Twitter, and Microsoft to provide 
access to customer records pursuant to the Pen/Trap Statute1 and the 
Stored Communications Act (SCA).2 The vast majority of the 
applications, and the orders granting them, are issued under seal.3 Recent 
data suggests that, at least in some districts, only 0.1% of electronic 
surveillance requests ever become public.4 Indeed, many of these 
                                                 
1. 18 U.S.C. § 3123 (2012). 
2. Id. § 2703. 
3. See TIM REAGAN & GEORGE CORT, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SEALED CASES IN FEDERAL 
 COURTS 21–22 (2009), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sealcafc.pdf/$file/sealcafc.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2PM7-Y&MF] [hereinafter FJC STUDY]. 
4. See Spencer S. Hsu & Rachel Weiner, U.S. Courts: Electronic Surveillance Up 500 Percent in 
D.C.-Area Since 2011, Almost All Sealed Cases, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2016), 
http://wapo.st/2lgRxeW [https://perma.cc/BWJ9-YJAH]. 
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applications and orders are made within entirely secret dockets 
unavailable to the public at all.5 The recipients frequently receive gag 
orders directing them not to notify any person of the existence of the 
order.6 While federal and state judges occasionally publish opinions in 
exceptional cases raising novel statutory issues, most of the requests are 
never acknowledged in published decisions. The result—an immense 
and growing docket of secret legal decisions issued in connection with 
criminal investigations.7 
Many of these secret orders raise important constitutional and 
statutory issues. For example, does the Pen/Trap Statute authorize the 
use of a cell site simulator, sometimes also known as a stingray?8 Only a 
few courts have issued public opinions explaining the legal authority for 
using stingrays to conduct communications surveillance.9 One 
magistrate judge in the Northern District of Illinois, issuing an order 
imposing particular minimization requirements for the use of stingrays, 
noted that the “dearth of case law discussing these devices” prevented 
the court from even being aware of whether “judges may be allowing the 
                                                 
5. See, e.g., Application of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press to Unseal & for 
Other Appropriate Relief, In re Application of Jason Leopold to Unseal Certain Elec. Surveillance 
Applications & Orders, No. 1:13-mc-00712-BAH (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2017), ECF No. 18 (“Such 
applications and orders are routinely maintained under seal indefinitely, even when the related 
investigation is no longer active, and are generally not reflected on publicly available court 
dockets.”). 
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) (setting out requirements for separate nondisclosure order); id. 
§ 3123(d) (requiring an order for installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace to direct that 
the recipient “not disclose the existence of the pen register or trap and trace device or the existence 
of the investigation to the listed subscriber, or to any other person, unless or until otherwise ordered 
by the court”). 
7. See generally Stephen Wm. Smith, Gagged, Sealed & Delivered: Reforming ECPA’s Secret 
Docket, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 313 (2012); Stephen Wm. Smith, Kudzu in the Courthouse: 
Judgments Made in the Shade, 3 FED. CTS. L. REV. 177 (2009). 
8. Stingrays are devices that pose as cell towers, forcing nearby cell phones to connect, and 
monitor call information. 
9. United States v. Tutis, 216 F. Supp. 3d 467, 484–85 (D.N.J. 2016) (denying motion to suppress 
evidence obtained after investigators obtained a communications data warrant authorizing use of a 
cell site simulator); United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d. 606, 614–16 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) 
(granting motion to suppress evidence obtained after DEA investigators obtained a pen register 
authorizing stingray use); In re The Application of the United States for an Order Relating to Tels. 
Used by Suppressed, No. 15 M 0021, 2015 WL 6871289, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2015) (“This 
opinion explains this Court’s requirements relating to the use of cell-site simulators in a typical 
drug-trafficking investigation.”); In re The Application of the United States for an Order 
Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747, 
752 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (requiring a search warrant for use of a stingray). 
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use of cell-site simulators without possessing a complete understanding 
of the device and how it works.”10 
New policing technologies like stingrays present urgent questions 
about how courts should apply legal protections in novel settings, but the 
public is frequently uncertain about the answers. What’s more, those 
new technologies are only seldom regulated ex ante. Legislation 
prescribing, for example, how police use automated license plate 
readers, drones, x-ray backscatter vans, ShotSpotter systems, or facial 
recognition software is haphazard or nonexistent. Public debate about 
the appropriate use of these technologies is usually reactive, not 
proactive. 
Against this background, the Pen/Trap Statute and the SCA stand 
apart: these statutes regulate when, how, and upon what standard police 
may acquire information about communications, directly from third-
party service providers. Both federal and state law enforcement agencies 
rely on their ability to obtain information concerning electronic 
communications to investigate crimes ranging from Social Security 
Disability fraud11 and robbery12 to investigations of Wikileaks13 and the 
Inauguration Day “riots.”14 These statutes govern how investigators can 
obtain both content and metadata of electronic communications, either in 
stored form or in real time.15 Yet even though these techniques are 
subject to ex ante judicial review, they remain virtually insulated from 
public scrutiny and oversight. 
Nor does the Fourth Amendment, which traditionally has regulated 
police investigations, appear to require much in the way of transparency. 
In general, the Fourth Amendment might require that police give notice 
when they execute a search or seizure warrant.16 But the Constitution 
requires only that the person searched receive notice, not that the 
                                                 
10. 2015 WL 6871289, at *2. 
11. In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc., 29 N.Y.3d 231, 239 (N.Y. 2017). 
12. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 
(2017).  
13. In re Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(d), 
707 F.3d 283 (4th Cir. 2013). 
14. Adam Edelman, Feds Demand Facebook Share Information on Anti-Trump Protesters, NBC 
NEWS (Sept. 29, 2017, 3:19 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department/feds-
demand-facebook-share-information-anti-trump-protesters-n805801 [https://perma.cc/E6FH-PSQ7]. 
15. See infra tbl.1. 
16. See, e.g., City of W. Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 241 (1999) (requiring that law 
enforcement give property owners “[i]ndividualized notice” after property is seized); Jonathan 
Witmer-Rich, The Rapid Rise of Delayed Notice Searches, and the Fourth Amendment “Rule 
Requiring Notice,” 41 PEPP. L. REV. 509, 527–28 (2014). 
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government notify the general public or otherwise expose its practices to 
public inspection. To the contrary, the United States Supreme Court has 
stated that the “success” of electronic surveillance “depends on 
secrecy.”17 Moreover, many communications surveillance scenarios 
involve no search warrant, and therefore no Fourth Amendment 
protections at all.18 
Many scholars have grappled with critical substantive questions 
concerning the constitutionality of communications surveillance through 
the lens of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.19 Although warrantless 
communications surveillance of this type might violate substantive First 
Amendment rights,20 and imposing gag orders may constitute an 
unlawful prior restraint,21 only rarely have scholars focused on the 
secrecy of surveillance in ordinary criminal investigations as a 
substantive and procedural harm.22 
The indefinite concealment from public view of electronic 
surveillance applications and orders violates the public’s First 
Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings and documents and 
                                                 
17. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967). 
18. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–43 (1979) (holding that individuals have no 
expectation of privacy in historical cell site location information obtained from service providers); 
see also United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 2016) (same); United States v. 
Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 890 (6th Cir. 2016) (same); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 513 
(11th Cir. 2015) (same), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015); In re Application of the United States 
for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 2013) (same). 
19. See, e.g., James X. Dempsey, Keynote Address: The Path to ECPA Reform and the 
Implications of United States v. Jones, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 225 (2012); Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone 
Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681 
(2011); Brian L. Owsley, The Fourth Amendment Implications of the Government’s Use of Cell 
Tower Dumps in Its Electronic Surveillance, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2013); Stephanie K. Pell & 
Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement 
Access to Location Data that Congress Could Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117 (2012); 
Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Your Secret StingRay’s No Secret Anymore: The 
Vanishing Government Monopoly over Cell Phone Surveillance and Its Impact on National Security 
and Consumer Privacy, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2014). 
20. Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Process Without Procedure: National Security Letters and First 
Amendment Rights, 49 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 367 (2016); Gerald J. Votava III, First Amendment 
Concerns in Governmental Acquisition and Analysis of Mobile Device Location Data, 13 U. PITT. J. 
TECH. L. & POL’Y 1 (2013); Rebecca Wexler, Note, Gags as Guidance: Expanding Notice of 
National Security Letter Investigations to Targets and the Public, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 325 
(2016). 
21. Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2330 
(2014) (“[D]igital surveillance necessitates wide ranging use of prior restraint . . . .”). 
22. Kevin S. Bankston, Only the DOJ Knows: The Secret Law of Electronic Surveillance, 41 
U.S.F. L. REV. 589 (2007); Patrick Toomey & Brett Max Kaufman, The Notice Paradox: Secret 
Surveillance, Criminal Defendants, & the Right to Notice, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 843 (2014); 
see also Bloch-Wehba, supra note 20; Wexler, supra note 20. 
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endangers our ability to hold police accountable for their actions.23 Part I 
of this Article evaluates the application of the First Amendment right of 
access to warrantless electronic surveillance orders. Under the First 
Amendment, the public has a qualified right of access to government 
proceedings and documents where there is a history of public access and 
where openness serves a positive function.24 Appellate courts have split, 
however, regarding the application of this test to judicial proceedings 
that are the creation of statute and have little or no historical precedent.25 
Secrecy of electronic surveillance orders and applications also implicates 
recognized rights of access to docket sheets and judicial orders. 
While secrecy now appears to be baked into huge swaths of 
investigative activity, historically this was not always the case. Section 
II.A illustrates how, at the framing of the Fourth Amendment, searches 
and seizures occurred in public, in real time and space, with neighbors 
and strangers watching and even participating as constables and customs 
officers rifled through homes, offices, and shops. The open and publicly 
accountable nature of searches and seizures was a key feature that 
fostered popular opposition to the scourges of general warrants and writs 
of assistance, promoted public understanding of the law of search and 
seizure, and ultimately led to the framers’ adoption of the Fourth 
Amendment in order to restrain the government from warrantless and 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Technological evolution prompted law enforcement investigations to 
become less transparent over time, as set forth in section II.B. Beginning 
with the Supreme Court’s 1928 holding in Olmstead v. United States26 
that eavesdropping, without physical trespass, did not constitute a Fourth 
Amendment “search,”27 investigations became much more opaque. 
Under the Olmstead holding and subsequent federal legislation, law 
enforcement was permitted to eavesdrop without a warrant—but was not 
allowed to use the evidence against a defendant in criminal 
                                                 
23. Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827 
(2015). 
24. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1 (1986). 
25. Compare, e.g., id., and United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(recognizing that the fact that certain hearings have no historical counterpart does not preclude a 
right of access), with In re Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
Section 2703(d), 707 F.3d 283, 291 (4th Cir. 2013), and United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 
161 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (emphasizing the requirement of a history of access, even to novel 
proceedings). 
26. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
27. Id. at 466. 
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proceedings.28 As a result, eavesdropping and wiretapping were 
occurring out of the eye of the public, unmoored from constitutional 
protections, and unmonitored by the courts. When, nearly half a century 
later, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment protects intangible 
conversations from unreasonable, unwarrantless searches,29 the 
application of the warrant requirement should have brought searches 
back into the public eye. But instead, when Congress enacted legislation 
to govern electronic surveillance, protect individual rights, and regulate 
law enforcement, these laws frequently codified sweeping nondisclosure 
requirements as well.30 
Making warrantless communications surveillance documents more 
transparent to the public also serves logical ends. Section III.A 
demonstrates that transparency of electronic surveillance applications 
and orders plays a critical role in ensuring the integrity of the process for 
authorizing surveillance and in the criminal justice process more 
broadly. Increasing transparency would boost the ability of judges, 
regulators, and the public to understand the methods, techniques, 
procedures, and legal reasoning that undergird communications 
surveillance. Even though the government applies for court orders ex 
parte, subjecting applications and orders to public scrutiny may deter 
police and prosecutorial misconduct. In addition, many of the traditional 
Fourth Amendment safeguards are absent in the statutory framework for 
electronic surveillance. The warrantless surveillance context lacks both 
ex ante safeguards like probable cause and prior notice, as well as the 
classic ex post remedy of exclusion.31 In the Fourth Amendment setting, 
all three of these safeguards serve values of transparency by facilitating 
public scrutiny of the investigative process. 
When police conduct, law enforcement tools, and the very rules that 
govern policing are cloaked in secrecy, it has systemic effects beyond a 
single defendant or criminal case, as set forth in section III.B. Law 
enforcement’s failure to publicly acknowledge the use of new 
technologies keeps that technology out of the public eye and limits 
                                                 
28. See Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 
ALA. L. REV. 9, 28 (2004) (discussing the government’s “aggressive interpretations” of the 
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, 1100 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958) 
(amended 1968))). 
29. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
30. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3123(d) (2012) (codifying sealing requirement in the Pen/Trap Statute); 
id. § 2518 (same, for Wiretap Act). 
31. See United States v. Rigmaiden, No. 08-814-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 1932800, at *10 (D. Ariz. 
May 8, 2013) (“Suppression is not an available remedy for violations of the SCA.”). 
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debate about its appropriate use. The development of a secret body of 
law keeps judges from a full understanding of how to apply existing 
statutes and constitutional protections to new policing tools. The absence 
of even basic information about how frequently police use electronic 
surveillance tools makes it impossible to understand whether law 
enforcement is abusing its authority. 
Part IV details why recognizing a right of access to electronic 
surveillance applications and orders strikes an appropriate balance 
between three competing objectives: law enforcement’s need for 
secrecy, individual privacy, and the transparency essential to democratic 
accountability. Even if the First Amendment right of access attaches, it 
can be overcome if the government demonstrates that it has a compelling 
need for secrecy and the closure is narrowly tailored to meet that need. 
While the right of access might be overcome while an investigation is 
pending and surveillance is ongoing, changes in circumstances likely 
allow the applications and orders to become public later in time. Courts 
can also protect the privacy rights of individuals whose surveillance 
records may be unsealed through narrowly tailored redactions rather 
than wholesale secrecy. The classic methods of safeguarding private 
information in court filings—careful redactions and limitations on the 
duration of sealing—are equally useful in the surveillance context. 
Electronic surveillance laws today have entrenched secrecy by design, 
limiting transparency in ways that hamper democratic accountability and 
impede public understanding of critical aspects of the criminal justice 
process. Secrecy is not just an accidental byproduct of the investigative 
process, but a sought-after result. Holding electronic surveillance to the 
same standards of transparency as physical searches would demonstrably 
improve the public’s ability to hold police, prosecutors, and the courts 
accountable for the use—and misuse—of surveillance tools. 
I. THE RIGHT OF ACCESS IN THE ELECTRONIC 
SURVEILLANCE CONTEXT 
Routine sealing of court records—including the court orders 
authorizing electronic surveillance—implicates the public’s right of 
access to judicial records and proceedings.32 So, too, do rules, practices, 
and procedures that impede access without meeting the appropriate 
common law and constitutional standards. While routine sealing in the 
                                                 
32. See In re Sealing & Non-Disclosure of Pen/Trap/2703(d) Orders, 562 F. Supp. 2d 876, 886 
(S.D. Tex. 2008) (noting “[a]n indefinite non-disclosure order is tantamount to a permanent 
injunction of prior restraint” subject to the highest level of scrutiny). 
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electronic surveillance context remains commonplace in district courts 
throughout the nation, few litigants have challenged rules and practices 
requiring secrecy by seeking to vindicate a right of access under either 
the common law or the First Amendment.33 This Part briefly outlines the 
contours of these two methods of ensuring access to judicial proceedings 
and documents, and then explores how the First Amendment right of 
access might be applied to electronic surveillance applications and 
orders. 
A. The Common Law and Constitutional Right of Access to Judicial 
Proceedings and Documents 
In a series of cases during the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court 
recognized public rights of access to court proceedings and documents 
grounded in the Constitution and the common law. In 1978, the Supreme 
Court found it “clear” that “the courts of this country recognize a general 
right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including 
judicial records and documents.”34 In Nixon v. Warner Communications, 
Inc.,35 a group of broadcasters sought to obtain copies of twenty-two 
hours of the Nixon White House tape recordings that had been played in 
the courtroom during the Watergate trial.36 The Court recognized that the 
recordings were precisely the type of “public records” to which a right of 
access attaches.37 
When a party seeks access to a judicial record under the common law, 
the court is “faced with the task of weighing the interests advanced by 
the parties in light of the public interest and the duty of the courts.”38 On 
the side of disclosure, the Nixon Court found that a “newspaper 
publisher’s intention to publish information concerning the operation of 
government” or “the citizen’s desire to keep a watchful eye on the 
workings of public agencies” were interests sufficient to support access 
                                                 
33. See, e.g., In re Petition of Jennifer Granick & Riana Pfefferkorn to Unseal Tech.-Assistance 
Orders & Materials, No. 16-mc-80206-KAW (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2016) (seeking unsealing of 
surveillance orders and applications under the First Amendment); United States v. Pen Register, No. 
2:10-mj-01235 (S.D. Tex. June 4, 2015) (intervening to unseal pen register application); In re The 
Application of Jason Leopold to Unseal Certain Elec. Surveillance Applications & Orders, No. 13-
712 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2013) (seeking unsealing of pen register and trap and trace applications and 
orders under the First Amendment). 
34. Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). 
35. 435 U.S. 589 (1978). 
36. Id. at 594. 
37. Id. at 597. 
38. Id. at 602. 
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to judicial documents.39 Among the countervailing interests were the 
disgraced President Nixon’s own property and privacy interests in the 
recordings, as well as his desire that the tapes not be commercialized.40 
The Nixon Court ultimately dodged the balancing inquiry by holding 
that the Presidential Recordings Act provided an alternative for gaining 
access to the records at issue in the case.41 It concluded, nonetheless, that 
“any access scheme finally implemented” under the Act would still need 
to satisfy statutory and constitutional requirements.42 
As the balance of interests in the Nixon case suggests, the common 
law presumption of access to judicial documents “can be overcome by a 
competing, but not necessarily a constitutionally compelled, interest.”43 
Likewise, courts “cannot craft federal common law when Congress has 
spoken directly to the issue at hand.”44 As a result, a common law right 
of access may be displaced or superseded by a statute that provides a 
substitute disclosure scheme or advances a sufficiently weighty interest 
in closure.45 For example, the D.C. Circuit has indicated that the 
common law right of access to hearings and materials related to a grand 
jury investigation, if any existed, would have been “supplanted” by Rule 
6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.46 
After Nixon, the Court recognized that the Constitution imposes an 
even higher standard upon interference with the public’s right to attend 
certain government proceedings. The First Amendment confers a public 
right of access to a variety of criminal proceedings—including trials,47 
voir dire,48 and preliminary hearings.49 Under the First Amendment, as 
                                                 
39. Id. at 597–99. 
40. Id. at 601–02; see also United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 317–21 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(articulating six factors for courts to weigh in considering whether to unseal judicial documents).  
41. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 603–07. 
42. Id. at 607–08. 
43. Lynn B. Oberlander, A First Amendment Right of Access to Affidavits in Support of Search 
Warrants, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2216, 2217 (1990). 
44. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 937 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
45. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246, 1263 (10th Cir. 1998) (explaining that the 
rules related to the release of information under the Criminal Justice Act “occupy this field and 
would supercede the common law right even if one existed”); see also MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability 
Oversight Council, 865 F.3d 661, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that the Dodd-Frank Act does not 
“categorically bar disclosure by courts” of financial information in briefs and other court 
documents). 
46. In re Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496, 504 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
47. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
48. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501 (1984). 
49. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1 (1986). 
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the Supreme Court recognized in Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court of 
California (Press-Enterprise II),50 a court considering an access claim 
must assess both “whether public access plays a significant positive role 
in the functioning of the particular process in question” and “whether the 
place and process have historically been open to the press and general 
public.”51 
If the First Amendment right attaches, the standard for closure is far 
more demanding than under the common law: “[t]he presumption of 
openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on 
findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”52 This more robust standard 
guides courts when they consider whether statutes limiting access 
comply with the Constitution. Any statute that purports to supplant the 
common-law right of access remains subject to the requirements of the 
First Amendment if it limits the ability to view and inspect records or 
proceedings to which the public has a constitutional right. 
In fact, the First Amendment right of access evolved out of the close 
relationship between judicial transparency, criminal justice, and 
democratic oversight. In 1979, the Supreme Court—while holding that 
the Sixth Amendment did not guarantee a public right of access to 
criminal trials—indicated that there might be a right of access to 
criminal trials couched in the First and Fourteenth Amendments.53 The 
Court soon explicitly recognized the First Amendment right of access to 
criminal trials, holding in Richmond Newspapers54 in 1980 that “the 
right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First 
Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials, which people 
have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and 
of the press could be eviscerated.”55 
In his concurrence, Justice Brennan identified “two helpful 
principles” to cabin the application of the right of access.56 First, 
Brennan emphasized the importance of history, writing that “the case for 
a right of access has special force when drawn from an enduring and 
vital tradition of public entree to particular proceedings or information,” 
                                                 
50. 478 U.S. 1 (1986). 
51. Id. at 8. 
52. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510. 
53. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 391–92 (1979). 
54. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
55. Id. at 580 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
56. Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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and that “what is crucial in individual cases is whether access to a 
particular government process is important in terms of that very 
process.”57 Second, Brennan recognized that the right of access to 
government proceedings served an important functional end as a critical 
feature of the First Amendment’s “structural role . . . in securing and 
fostering our republican system of self-government.”58 Far from being 
limited to criminal trials, Brennan wrote, the structural model of press 
freedom stemmed from the right to gather information—and “the stretch 
of this protection is theoretically endless.”59 
In the 1982 Globe Newspaper case,60 the Court returned to Brennan’s 
two-pronged approach, examining both the history of openness as well 
as the positive results that transparency yields. The Court struck down a 
Massachusetts law that “required the closure of sex-offense trials only 
during the testimony of minor victims,”61 elaborating on the reasons that 
access to criminal trials is so crucial. First, the Court found that the 
historical “presumption of openness”62 was virtually uninterrupted, a fact 
that “implies the favorable judgment of experience.”63 Second, public 
access leads to positive outcomes, the Court wrote: “[p]ublic scrutiny of 
a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the 
factfinding process . . . [and] fosters an appearance of fairness, thereby 
heightening public respect for the judicial process.”64 Although the 
Court recognized that the constitutional right of access to criminal trials 
is “not absolute,” it held that when the government attempts to deny 
access, “it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling 
governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”65 
Two years later, the Court expanded the constitutional right of access 
from criminal trials to other judicial proceedings. In Press-Enterprise 
Co. v. Superior Court of California (Press-Enterprise I),66 the Court 
held that the First Amendment guarantees the right to attend voir dire.67 
Looking to the “presumptive openness of the jury selection process” in 
                                                 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
59. Id. at 588 (citing William J. Brennan, Address, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 176 (1979)). 
60. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct. for Norfolk Cty., 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
61. Id. at 600. 
62. Id. at 605. 
63. Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
64. Id. at 606. 
65. Id. at 606–07. 
66. 464 U.S. 501 (1984). 
67. Id. 
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England both before and after the Norman Conquest, the Court 
determined that “[p]ublic jury selection thus was the common practice in 
America when the Constitution was adopted.”68 The public face of the 
criminal justice process “gave assurance to those not attending trials that 
others were able to observe the proceedings and enhanced public 
confidence.”69 
Based both on this historical experience as well as its apparently 
positive outcome, the Court concluded, “[c]losed proceedings, although 
not absolutely precluded, must be rare and only for cause shown that 
outweighs the value of openness.”70 The Court emphasized that the 
standard for closing proceedings was extraordinarily demanding: “[t]he 
presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding 
interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher 
values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”71 
Finally, in 1986, the Court considered whether a First Amendment 
right of access attaches to preliminary hearings in criminal 
prosecutions.72 Recognizing that the preceding decisions had 
“emphasized two complementary considerations,”73 the Press-Enterprise 
II Court articulated a two-prong test for whether the right of access 
attaches to a particular proceeding. A court considering an access claim 
must assess both “whether public access plays a significant positive role 
in the functioning of the particular process in question” and “whether the 
place and process have historically been open to the press and general 
public.”74 
None of these cases overtly restricted the First Amendment right of 
access to judicial proceedings. Rather, in Press-Enterprise II, the Court 
referred to “governmental processes.”75 And, indeed, appellate courts 
have since found that the First Amendment right of access applies 
broadly: to administrative proceedings,76 classified evidence in habeas 
hearings brought by detainees at Guantánamo Bay,77 horse roundups,78 
                                                 
68. Id. at 508. 
69. Id. at 507. 
70. Id. at 509. 
71. Id. at 510. 
72. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986). 
73. Id. at 8. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Township of W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 1999). 
77. Dhiab v. Obama, 70 F. Supp. 3d 486 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Dhiab v. Trump, 852 
F.3d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
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and executions.79 While the constitutional right of access is expansive, 
however, it is not limitless. As the Supreme Court has recognized, the 
presumption of openness may be overcome based on a compelling 
government interest, which “is to be articulated along with findings 
specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure 
order was properly entered.”80 
B. Closure and Surveillance 
A variety of statutes regulate how the government can obtain content 
and metadata from third-party service providers. The SCA permits the 
government to apply for a court order requiring a communications 
service provider to disclose either stored communications content (e.g., 
emails or messaging transcripts) or metadata (e.g., “to” and “from” 
information).81 When the government seeks a search warrant for stored 
communications, it must follow the procedures in Rule 41 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which governs search warrant practice as a 
general matter.82 The Pen/Trap Statute permits the government to apply 
for a court order requiring a communications service provider to assist in 
placing a pen register or trap and trace device on a communications line 
to monitor metadata in real time.83 Lastly, the Wiretap Act, also known 
as “Title III,” authorizes the government to seek an order to intercept 
wire, oral, or electronic communications in real time.84 
All three statutes include provisions that flout the norms of court 
openness. The Pen/Trap Statute requires that an “order” should be 
sealed,85 while Title III requires the sealing of applications and orders 
                                                 
78. Leigh v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2012). 
79. Cal. First Amendment Coal. v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002). 
80. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984). 
81. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012). While the SCA does not always require law enforcement to get a 
warrant for content, the Sixth Circuit and numerous lower courts have held that the Fourth 
Amendment protects the content of emails. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 
2010); see also JENNIFER R. HENRICHSEN & HANNAH BLOCH-WEHBA, ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS SURVEILLANCE: WHAT JOURNALISTS AND MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS NEED  
TO KNOW 5 n.18 (2017), https://www.rcfp.org/rcfp/orders/docs/SURVEILLANCE.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/6AK5-CYFW]. 
82. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. 
83. Pen registers are devices that can record “dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling 
information” for outgoing communications, such as the phone numbers for outgoing calls. 18 
U.S.C. § 3127(3). Trap and trace devices record the same information for incoming 
communications. Id. § 3127(4). 
84. Id. §§ 2510–2522. 
85. Id. § 3123. 
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(as well as any recordings made during the period of the wiretap).86 
These sealing provisions direct courts to maintain the documents in a 
manner that prevents the public, or other parties, from accessing them. In 
contrast, neither the SCA nor Rule 41 includes any provisions 
authorizing sealing of judicial records. Instead, both authorities include 
provisions requiring notification of the affected individual as a general 
rule, but permitting the government to delay notice if a court finds 
“reason to believe” that notice “may have an adverse result.”87 In its 
most recent report, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts tallies a 
total of 14,801 applications for delayed notice search warrants, and 
extensions thereof, in fiscal year 2015. 88 All but twenty-eight 
applications were granted.89 Over 80% of the applications were issued in 
connection with investigations of drug crimes.90 
The SCA also permits the government to apply for a separate court 
order “commanding” the recipient of an SCA warrant or subpoena not to 
notify any person of the existence of the order.91 This “secrecy order” 
provision requires that a court find “reason to believe that notification of 
the existence of the warrant, subpoena, or court order will result in” one 
of the enumerated harms.92 
So-called “secrecy orders” are distinct from sealing provisions; they 
are not instructions to courts, but rather restraints upon recipients—
private companies and individuals—that prevent them from speaking to 
the public. Secrecy orders thus raise an additional First Amendment 
concern, because they constitute prior restraints on the First Amendment 
rights of the recipients, who may wish to speak about the orders they 
have received.93 While the government does not disclose the number of 
                                                 
86. Id. § 2518. 
87. Id. § 2705(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The enumerated “adverse result[s]” are the following: 
“(A) endangering the life or physical safety of an individual; (B) flight from prosecution; (C) 
destruction of or tampering with evidence; (D) intimidation of potential witnesses; or (E) otherwise 
seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial.” Id. § 2705(a)(2). 
88. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ON APPLICATIONS FOR DELAYED-NOTICE SEARCH 




91. 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b). 
92. Id. (emphasis added). 
93. Prior restraints are “administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications 
when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur.” Alexander v. United 
States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993). 
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secrecy orders sought each year,94 Microsoft, in recent litigation, has 
claimed that it received over 3,250 secrecy orders over a twenty-month 
period alone.95 In response to Microsoft’s lawsuit, the Department of 
Justice recently adopted a new policy that will require each secrecy 
order to have “an appropriate factual basis” and presumes that, 
“[b]arring exceptional circumstances,” a secrecy order should last no 
longer than one year.96 
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94. See infra section III.D. 
95. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgement at ¶ 5, Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d. 887 (W.D. Wash. 2017) (No. 2:16-cv-00538-JLR), ECF No. 28. 
96. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GEN., POLICY REGARDING 
APPLICATIONS FOR PROTECTIVE ORDERS PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 2705(B) (2017), https://www 
.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/page/file/1005791/download [https://perma.cc/4VLZ-CXSE]. 
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1. Secrecy’s Widespread Impact 
As a result of the sealing, non-disclosure, and delayed-notice 
provisions codified in federal surveillance law, secrecy is now a 
condition endemic to the federal courts.97 A 2009 study found that, in the 
year 2006, over 15,000 sealed magistrate judge cases were filed, 83% of 
which were “warrant-type applications.”98 Of the “warrant-type 
applications,” 54% were search warrants, and 37% were applications for 
pen registers, trap and traces, tracking devices, “and the like.”99 The 
study suggests that in the year 2006, the government filed 7,486 
applications in the federal courts for pen registers, trap and traces, 
tracking devices, and other court orders compelling disclosure of 
communications metadata—all of which were entirely secret.100 To put 
this in perspective, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts reports 
that in the twelve-month period ending in September 2006, magistrate 
judges handled a total of 32,467 search warrants;101 the study reports that 
some 7,400 sealed cases were search warrants.102 Over 22% of the 
search warrants issued in 2006 were entirely sealed.103 
Today, it appears that government is compelling companies to 
disclose user information at rates never before seen. The Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts reports that federal magistrate judges 
considered 72,960 applications for search warrants in the fiscal year 
ending in September 2016, over twice as many as in 2007.104 
Technology companies and communications providers now receive tens 
                                                 
97. See Smith, Gagged, Sealed & Delivered, supra note 7. 
98. FJC STUDY, supra note 3, at 21–22. 
99. Id. at 22. In addition, 8,121 sealed “miscellaneous cases” were filed that year, 58% of which 
were warrant-type applications. Id. at 23.  
100. Id. at 21–22. It is possible that the FJC Study was in fact underinclusive, since the study 
accounted only for cases that were entirely sealed, and did not analyze sealed documents in 
unsealed cases. See id. at 1 (“We did not count as sealed cases those with every document sealed 
and only highly redacted docket sheets available on PACER, because a method different from the 
one we used would be necessary to find all such cases.”). 
101. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS TABLE S-17, 2 (2006), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/13538/download [https://perma.cc/2EK9-L7VT]. 
102. FJC Study, supra note 3, at 23. 
103. This Article’s focus on federal courts is not meant to distract from similar issues facing state 
courts. State courts may issue orders under the Pen/Trap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3122, and the Stored 
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703. If anything, disparities in record-keeping and electronic 
docketing practices in state courts make it even more difficult to investigate and uncover sealing 
problems than in federal courts. Due to the lack of available data, however, the Article leaves for 
another day discussion of sealing issues in state courts. 
104. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS TABLE S-17 (2016), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/21849/download [https://perma.cc/HJ7U0AR8S]. 
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of thousands of government demands each year: Verizon received over 
21,000 search warrants in 2016.105 That number pales in comparison to 
the number of warrantless requests demanding non-content information, 
which far exceeds the number of search warrants.106 Facebook has 
reported that approximately 57% of the tens of thousands of law 
enforcement requests the company receives come with gag orders.107 
2. Secrecy in Judicial Administration 
Local judicial rules compound prosecutorial habit and the secrecy 
provisions in electronic surveillance statutes, giving rise to a system in 
which the government routinely applies for electronic surveillance 
orders in secret dockets, under complete seal. Given the overlapping and 
inconsistent provisions in electronic surveillance statutes, it is perhaps 
not surprising that district courts also exhibit inconsistencies in 
docketing applications for electronic surveillance. For example, some 
districts classify search warrants as “criminal,” others “miscellaneous,” 
and still other districts as “magistrate” cases.108 In addition, “[t]hree 
districts used ‘sw’ as a case type for search or seizure warrants,” and one 
district used “pr” as a case type for pen registers.109 
Many district courts have local rules that reflect a default presumption 
of secrecy. Some districts provide for routine sealing of documents filed 
in connection with applications for electronic surveillance.110 For 
example, the District of Minnesota requires applications for electronic 
surveillance to be made under seal and bars unsealing “except by court 
order.”111 Broad default sealing requirements result in more documents 
being filed under seal than requirements that the government apply for 
individual court orders each time it seeks to seal information. 
                                                 
105. United States Report, VERIZON, http://vz.to/2lMOyb5 [https://perma.cc/M2KW-YXVA]. 
106. Id. (showing that Verizon received over 32,000 non-search warrant orders). 
107. Transparency Report, FACEBOOK, https://govtrequests.facebook.com/country/United%20 
States/2016-H2/ [https://perma.cc/VWF7-CYF8]. 
108. FJC Study, supra note 3, at 2. 
109. Id. at 27. 
110. D. D.C. CT. R. 49(e) (requiring that applications for electronic surveillance be filed under 
seal, but not requiring a motion to seal); D. CONN. C.P.L.R. 57 (providing that orders authorizing a 
pen register or trap and trace are filed in a “miscellaneous sealed case”). However, the Connecticut 
rule differs for search warrant returns: “[u]nless otherwise directed by the Court for sufficient cause, 
search warrant returns shall be docketed as unsealed filings.” Id.; see also Memorandum from 
Andrew Udelsman & Yurij Melnyk, Media Freedom & Info. Access Clinic, to Janet C. Hall, Chief 
Judge, D.D.C. (Apr. 27, 2017), https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/mfia/document/ 
2017.04.27_ mfia_scrap_ct_letter_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R9B-AQLV]. 
111. D. MINN. L. R. 49.1. 
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Electronically docketing surveillance materials also materially 
improves the public’s practical ability to gain access to information, but 
many districts nonetheless require surveillance applications to be filed 
only in paper form. In the Eastern District of Virginia, District of 
Columbia, and many other districts, search warrants and pen registers 
are filed in paper and never made available electronically.112 Electronic 
filing and docketing practices were adopted, not to facilitate access by 
the public, but rather because improvements in cost and efficiency 
offered “major gains for judges and court administrators.”113 Electronic 
docketing, however, has also fundamentally changed researchers’ ability 
to access court data.114 Jurisdictions that exempt surveillance orders 
from electronic filing forego gains in efficiency as well as in public 
accountability. Judicial districts that exempt electronic surveillance 
documents from e-filing choose not to avail themselves of an automated 
system reminding the government that it must meet an affirmative 
obligation in order to maintain a record under seal. As a result, secret 
orders may fly under the radar of the courts and the public. 
District courts can also reduce the scope and extent of sealing if they 
adopt default rules regarding judicial oversight or review of secrecy 
requirements. Although electronic surveillance laws might require that 
applications be filed under seal as an initial matter, they also anticipate 
that secrecy need not last forever.115 Local rules also can trigger 
mandatory action by the court or by prosecutors to review and, if 
                                                 
112. U.S. DIST. COURT E. DIST. OF VA., EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ELECTRONIC CASE 
FILING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL, CHAPTER THREE: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 23 
(2013), http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/ecf/documents/Chapter3-PoliciesandProcedureswithTitle 
Page1-11-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/KT8V-FP6Y] (creating exception to e-filing rules for warrant-
type documents); see also U.S. DIST. COURT DIST. OF ARIZ., ELECTRONIC CASE FILING 
ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL 23 (2016), http://www.azd.uscourts.gov/ 
sites/default/files/documents/adm%20manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/RV7M-M2SX] (same); U.S. 
DIST. COURT FOR S. DIST. OF CAL., ELECTRONIC CASE FILING ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES AND 
PROCEDURES MANUAL 19 (2017), https://www.casd.uscourts.gov/CMECF/Lists/Policies%20 
and%20Procedures/Attachments/8/CASDPolicies_01-20-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/YVK5-7N7R] 
(same); U.S. DIST. COURT S. DIST. OF TEX., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES FOR ELECTRONIC 
FILING IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2007), http://www.txs.uscourts.gov/sites/txs/files/ 
admcvcrproc.pdf [https://perma.cc/5K78-KHET] (same); C.D. CAL. L. CR. R. 49-1.2 (same); D. 
D.C. CT. R. 49(e) (same). 
113. Peter W. Martin, Online Access to Court Records, 53 VILL. L. REV. 855, 864 (2008). 
114. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Politics of Research Access to Federal Court Data, 80 TEX. 
L. REV. 2161, 2165 (2002) (writing that the U.S. Party/Case Index in an early version of PACER 
was “of marginal value for research because one can enter only a single name at a time and get only 
the name of the court and the number of the file”). 
115. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3123(d) (2012) (requiring sealing “until otherwise ordered by the 
court”); id. at § 2705 (providing for delayed notice). 
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necessary, either renew or remove sealing requirements later in time. For 
example, the Eastern District of Missouri provides that applications for 
search warrants are “received by the Court under temporary seal,” but 
that continued secrecy requires a motion “establishing a compelling 
interest necessitating a restriction on public access” within fourteen 
days.116 Likewise, the Southern District of Alabama requires “[a] 
publicly filed motion and order citing only the statutory authority for 
sealing” for electronic surveillance orders, but it also provides that 
sealed documents are to be unsealed after 120 days.117 
It is intuitive that, as a practical matter, sunset provisions that create 
an automatic, mandatory docket entry reminding the court that a docket, 
application, or order is due to be unsealed are likely to result in more 
unsealing than those that require action by the government or sua sponte 
by the court. Sunset provisions that mandate routine unsealing of search 
warrant returns and other sealed documents can greatly reduce the 
number of judicial documents that remain secret in the long term. 
An ongoing case provides an illustrative example of the obstacles to 
gaining access to surveillance materials. Researchers in the Northern 
District of California have alleged that that district maintains an entirely 
sealed docket for applications and orders under the SCA and the 
Pen/Trap Statute.118 The petitioners sought the docketing and unsealing 
of court records related to matters arising under the Wiretap Act, the 
SCA, and the Pen/Trap Statute.119 In response, the federal government 
requested an opportunity to be heard because it “has an overarching 
interest in enforcing federal law, including these confidentiality 
provisions.”120 During oral argument on the petitioners’ motion, the 
government notified the court that the United States Attorney’s Office 
was “reviewing its own files to see what could be unsealed.”121 Months 
later, the government has still not unsealed a single item from the 
thousands of surveillance orders issued between 2006 and 2011 that the 
                                                 
116. E.D. MO. L.R. 83-13.05. 
117. S.D. ALA. GEN. L.R 5.2. 
118. Petition to Unseal Technical-Assistance Orders & Materials, In re Petition of Jennifer 
Granick & Riana Pfefferkorn to Unseal Tech.-Assistance Orders & Materials, No. 16-mc-80206-
KAW (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2016), ECF No. 1. 
119. Id. 
120. United States’ Statement of Interest at 3, In re Petition of Jennifer Granick, No. 16-mc-
80206-KAW (Oct. 13, 2016), ECF No. 6. 
121. Order Denying Motion to Unseal Documents & Publicly Docket Court Records, In re 
Petition of Jennifer Granick, No. 16-mc-80206-KAW (June 23, 2017), ECF No. 36 [hereinafter 
Order Denying Motion]. 
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prosecutors were reviewing.122 And without a functioning public docket, 
petitioners cannot even identify—let alone move to unseal—individual 
cases of interest.123 
Notwithstanding these flaws, the court concluded that, while a 
qualified right of access to electronic surveillance orders exists, it lacked 
the authority to “reverse the sealing orders of other judges in this 
district.”124 Moreover, the court determined that the petition was 
overbroad because some of the surveillance orders may pertain to 
investigations that were still active, and the petitioners had not identified 
particular cases that were closed and could be unsealed.125 This finding 
flouts the traditional rule that the government bears the burden to justify 
closure, and ignores that the government’s ability to do so may well 
erode over time.126 Moreover, the court’s position that its hands were 
tied with regard to other cognate courts’ sealing orders ignores the 
systemic issues raised by the petitioners concerning the problematic 
docketing and sealing practices of the Northern District. The case is still 
ongoing.127 
The result of this ad-hoc, patchwork system is that district courts 
around the country offer drastically different degrees of transparency 
and accessibility with regard to judicial documents related to 
surveillance. Even in districts where routine unsealing is the rule, local 
practices may make it difficult to identify and locate dockets that include 
electronic surveillance applications and orders. As a practical matter, the 
inconsistency among the districts makes it difficult for the public to 
understand either local or national patterns regarding electronic 
surveillance—for example, whether a certain U.S. Attorney’s office 
seeks pen registers at a rate that is far below the norm, or whether a 
given judge does not require sealing orders in some types of cases. As a 
legal matter, local rules and practices that permit sealing of electronic 
                                                 
122. Joint Status Report at 1, In re Petition of Jennifer Granick, No. 16-mc-80206-KAW (Aug. 
22, 2017), ECF No. 38 (“To date, no currently sealed criminal miscellaneous matters from that time 
period have been determined to be suitable for unsealing.”). 
123. Id. at 10 (“With little to no information available to us, how could Petitioners could [sic] 
even learn of the existence of ‘particular historical matters’ to which we might wish to seek access, 
much less ask the Court for access to them?”). 
124. Order Denying Motion, supra note 121. 
125. Id. 
126. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct. for Norfolk Cty., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) (“[T]he 
State’s justification in denying access must be a weighty one.”). 
127. See Order Continuing Status Conference, In re Petition of Jennifer Granick, No. 16-mc-
80206-KAW (June 23, 2017), ECF No. 45 (continuing status conference until March 2018). 
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surveillance applications without either factual findings or provisions 
regarding unsealing violate the First Amendment and the common law. 
C. Applying the Right of Access to Surveillance Records 
The near-automatic application of secrecy requirements under the 
Pen/Trap Statute and the SCA implicates two interrelated doctrinal 
questions: how the First Amendment right of access should apply to 
novel forms of proceedings, and whether the right attaches to documents 
that were issued ex parte. Today, dozens of federal statutes appear to 
require or authorize sealing of judicial documents as a rule, without any 
analysis or findings by the court.128 These statutes, many of which were 
enacted in the fairly recent past, raise questions about whether the 
statutes impede access to documents to which the public has a 
constitutional right of access. 
Courts have taken two main approaches to resolving whether the First 
Amendment right of access attaches to judicial records.129 The first, 
“bifurcated” approach requires a litigant to establish both that the 
records to which she seeks access have historically been open and that 
transparency of those records serves a positive function.130 The second, 
“complementary” approach finds that the right of access to documents 
attaches when it is a “necessary corollary of the capacity to attend the 
relevant proceedings.”131 
Applying the first approach, courts have disagreed about how strictly 
to enforce the historical prong of the First Amendment test, particularly 
with regard to new proceedings. Courts following the strict historical 
approach usually conclude that, without a lengthy tradition of access to 
the particular proceeding at issue, no First Amendment right attaches.132 
For example, in the only appellate decision considering whether the First 
                                                 
128. See Memorandum from Andrea Thomson to Dan Coquillette & Richard Marcus (Dec. 10, 
2007) (on file with author). 
129. In re New York Times Co. to Unseal Wiretap & Search Warrant Materials, 577 F.3d 401, 
409 (2d Cir. 2009) (“We have previously endorsed two approaches to determine whether the First 
Amendment right of access extends to particular judicial records.”). 
130. United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246, 1258 (10th Cir. 1998) (describing the reasoning, 
“adopted by some courts, that the Press-Enterprise II analysis requires both the experience and 
logic prongs to be satisfied” (emphasis in original)). 
131. Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Doe v. Pub. 
Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 267 (4th Cir. 2014) (recognizing Fourth Circuit’s adoption of the Pellegrino 
approach). 
132. See In re Boston Herald, Inc., 321 F.3d 174, 182 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. El-
Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 160–61 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 64 (4th 
Cir. 1989)) (declining to decide whether to adopt the strict “two-prong” approach). 
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Amendment right of access attaches to SCA orders, the Fourth Circuit 
reasoned that because of the SCA’s recent vintage, it could identify “no 
long tradition of access specifically for § 2703(d) orders,” and the right 
of access therefore did not apply.133 The D.C. Circuit has taken the same 
approach in noting that “[t]here can hardly be a historical tradition of 
access to the documents accompanying a procedure that did not exist” 
until established by judicial decision in 1991.134 
Courts that adhere to a strict historical approach ignore the serious 
costs of allowing Congress to require secrecy in everyday judicial 
proceedings. These rulings tacitly permit Congress to displace the right 
of access merely by creating new, secret procedures—an endeavor that 
raises concerns not only about constitutional rights, but also about the 
separation of powers.135 This rigid approach also tends to ignore that—as 
Judith Resnik has pointed out in the context of alternative dispute 
resolution and arbitration—as statutory and technological change 
“reshape ‘experiences,’ they alter the ‘logic’ of what courts are about 
and when openness is therefore protected.”136 
Other courts have found that it is appropriate to “de-emphasize 
historical practices” if the proceeding or document in question is 
novel.137 This variation of the bifurcated approach has been particularly 
developed in the context of criminal pretrial proceedings such as 
suppression hearings, which “have no historical counterpart.”138 Courts 
adopting this approach have recognized that, at the time of the framing, 
“no one could have conceived that the exclusionary rule and pretrial 
motions to suppress evidence would be part of our criminal 
jurisprudence.”139 Appellate courts have concluded that searching for 
                                                 
133. In re Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(d), 
707 F.3d 283, 291 (4th Cir. 2013). 
134. United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 161 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
135. See infra section II.A. 
136. Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1816 (2014). 
137. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Kammeyer, 341 N.W.2d 550, 556 (Minn. 1983) (First 
Amendment right of access attaches to pretrial hearing on motions to suppress and to change 
venue); see also In re Copley Press, Inc., 518 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[L]ogic alone, even 
without experience, may be enough to establish the right.”). 
138. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 10 n.3 (1986). 
139. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 281 S.E.2d 915, 922 (Va. 1981) (quoting 
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 395–96 (Burger, C.J., concurring)); see also United 
States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 555 (3d Cir. 1982) (“We do not think that historical analysis is 
relevant in determining whether there is a first amendment right of access to pretrial criminal 
proceedings.”); Iowa Freedom of Info. Council v. Wifvat, 328 N.W.2d 920, 923 (Iowa 1983) 
(suppression hearings “are creatures unknown to traditional common law”). 
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historical patterns of access to pretrial hearings is often in vain: “[t]he 
most one could do is search for some pattern of access or non-access 
which may have developed in the area,” but such a pattern may not 
exist.140 Indeed, in some areas, a presumption of openness has developed 
even in the absence of “centuries of tradition.”141 In light of the fact that 
many pretrial hearings simply did not exist at common law, “the lack of 
an historic tradition of open . . . hearings does not bar our recognizing a 
right of access to such hearings.”142 
To complicate matters further, some courts have adopted an 
alternative method of applying the right of access to judicial records, 
recognizing that the right of access to documents is a “necessary 
corollary of the capacity to attend the relevant proceedings.”143 Rather 
than asking whether there is a history and logic to openness of the 
records themselves, this “complementary” approach asks whether the 
documents are tied to a judicial proceeding which the public has a 
constitutional right to attend. 
But proceedings for the issuance of the orders are historically ex 
parte.144 Although warrant affidavits and returns are typically filed with 
the clerk after a search is executed, courts have concluded that that 
practice is “not demanded by the [F]irst [A]mendment.”145 Moreover, it 
certainly remains true that pretrial proceedings for the issuance of search 
warrants or surveillance orders are “necessarily ex parte, since the 
subject of the search cannot be tipped off to the application for a warrant 
lest he destroy or remove evidence.”146 
Courts that follow the “necessary corollary” approach would likely 
reject a right of access to surveillance and warrant materials because 
                                                 
140. United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246, 1257 (10th Cir. 1998). 
141. Buzbee v. Journal Newspapers, Inc., 465 A.2d 426, 431 (Md. 1983).  
142. United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363–64 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Gannett, 443 U.S. at 
401 (Powell, J., concurring)) (holding that a First Amendment right of access attaches to bail 
reduction hearings, but that the right “extends no farther than the persons actually present at the time 
the motion [for bail] is made”); see also Seattle Times Co. v. D. for the W.D. of Wash., 845 F.2d 
1513, 1516 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding a First Amendment right of access to pretrial release 
proceedings). 
143. Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Doe v. Pub. 
Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 267 (4th Cir. 2014) (recognizing Fourth Circuit’s adoption of the Pellegrino 
approach). 
144. See Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Franks v. Delaware, 
438 U.S. 154, 169 (1978)). 
145. Id. 
146. Franks, 438 U.S. at 169 (quoted in In re The Search of Fair Fin., 692 F.3d 424, 430 (6th Cir. 
2012)). 
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there is no contemporaneous right of access to the underlying ex parte 
proceedings in which they are issued. In 2012, the Sixth Circuit relied on 
the ex parte nature of warrant proceedings to reject an attempt by two 
news organizations to gain access to search warrant materials filed under 
seal.147 The newspapers argued that under Rule 41, the obligation to 
deliver the executed warrant to the clerk is suggestive of a historical 
practice of openness, as “once the search warrant documents are 
returned to the clerk, they are routinely filed without seal.”148 The court, 
however, found it “indisputable that proceedings for the issuance of 
search warrants are not, and have not been, public.”149 
Nevertheless, as Lynn Oberlander points out, several circuits have 
extended the Press-Enterprise II holding to search warrant affidavits, 
with mixed results.150 For example, in 1989 the Ninth Circuit held that 
“members of the public have no right of access to search warrant 
affidavits while a pre-indictment investigation is under way.”151 The 
same year, the Fourth Circuit likewise rejected the Baltimore Sun’s 
assertion of a “right of access to inspect and copy affidavits supporting 
search warrants in the interval between execution of the warrants and 
indictment.”152 Neither court considered whether a right of access may 
attach after indictment or the resolution of an investigation.153 The 
Eighth Circuit has concluded that the public has a First Amendment 
right of access to search warrant affidavits even before an indictment 
had issued.154 The disparate outcomes of applications for access to 
                                                 
147. In re The Search of Fair Fin., 692 F.3d at 428. The news organizations filed a pre-
indictment motion for access to the search warrant materials, but by the time the court of appeals 
ruled on the issue, an indictment had been issued. The court of appeals did not address the effect of 
this procedural change, if any, upon the attachment of the First Amendment right. 
148. Id. at 430. 
149. Id. Although the court of appeals disagreed, the opinion also “reject[ed] the government’s 
suggestion that there is no First Amendment right of access to the search warrant documents here 
due to the fact that the search warrant application process is an investigative rather than a criminal 
proceeding.” Id. 
150. See Lynn B. Oberlander, A First Amendment Right of Access to Affidavits in Support of 
Search Warrants, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2216, 2217 (1990). 
151. Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1211 (9th Cir. 1989). 
152. Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 62 (4th Cir. 1989). 
153. See also In re EyeCare Physicians of Am., 100 F.3d 514, 516 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting 
EyeCare’s due process argument that it was entitled to the affidavits in support of the search warrant 
executed on its property, “for no person affiliated with EyeCare has even been indicted, much less 
deprived of life or liberty”). 
154. In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 575 (8th 
Cir. 1988). 
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search warrant materials appear to depend at least partly on the status of 
the investigation at the time of the request.155 
Only the Fourth Circuit has explicitly considered whether a right of 
access attaches to orders issued under the SCA.156 In In re Application of 
the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(d),157 
the Fourth Circuit was presented with an order and application relevant 
to the “pre-grand jury phase of an ongoing criminal investigation.”158 As 
the district court in that case observed, “there is no history of openness 
for documents related to an ongoing criminal investigation.”159 As a 
result, the Fourth Circuit summarily concluded that § 2703(d) orders 
“are most analogous to sealed or unexecuted search warrants and grand 
jury proceedings for which traditionally, there is no history of access.”160 
II. A HISTORY OF PUBLIC SEARCHES 
Even if the public has no right to attend proceedings at which search 
warrants and surveillance orders are issued, public access to the related 
materials might be a “necessary corollary” of a different proceeding: the 
search itself. There is a rich and unexplored history of open access to 
searches and seizures. During the framing generation and thereafter, 
public observation of searches and seizures, in real time and space as 
                                                 
155. See In re The Search of Fair Fin., 692 F.3d 424 (6th Cir. 2012) (no First Amendment right of 
access); In re EyeCare Physicians of Am., 100 F.3d at 517 (holding that no right of access to search 
warrant materials attaches under the Fourth Amendment); In re Application of Newsday, Inc., 895 
F.2d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1990) (avoiding the constitutional question by finding a common law right 
attaches); Goetz, 886 F.2d at 65 (finding that, while no right of access to search warrant materials 
attaches under the First Amendment, notice was still required); Times Mirror Co., 873 F.2d at 1216 
(“[T]he First Amendment does not establish a qualified right of access to search warrant 
proceedings and materials while a pre-indictment investigation is still ongoing.”). 
156. See In re Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 
2703(d), 707 F.3d 283, 291–92 (4th Cir. 2013) (concluding that no First Amendment right of access 
attaches to SCA orders); see also Craig Linder, Dow Jones Fights for Transparency, DOW  
JONES (June 3, 2014), http://www.dowjones.com/press-room/dow-jones-fights-transparency/ 
[https://perma.cc/J2GJ-UX44] (finding that no First Amendment right attaches, and common law 
does not require access). 
157. 707 F.3d 283 (4th Cir. 2013). 
158. Id. at 286. 
159. In re § 2703(d) Order, 787 F. Supp. 2d 430, 443 (E.D. Va. 2011). 
160. In re Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(d), 
707 F.3d at 292 n.9. But see In re Leopold to Unseal Certain Elec. Surveillance Applications & 
Orders, No. 13-MC-00712, 2018 WL 1129660, at *14 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2018) (“[N]one of the 
materials to which the petitioners seek access—not even SCA warrants—are analogous to 
traditional search warrants.”). 
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well as in the press, fostered criticism, debate, and resistance to abuses 
of power that were then proscribed in the Fourth Amendment. 
The Fourth Amendment grew out of a general consensus in the 
Framing generation against general, warrantless, and abusive searches of 
homes and private places.161 The two clauses of the Amendment—the 
first ensuring the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,” 
the second proscribing the issuance of warrants except “upon probable 
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized”—evinced 
the Framers’ reaction to two types of abuses suffered for centuries under 
British rule.162 
A full accounting of the contested history and historiography of the 
framing of the Fourth Amendment is far beyond the scope of this 
Article.163 Indeed, the hotly disputed questions surrounding the framing 
of the Fourth Amendment—the relationship between the two clauses of 
the Amendment, the historical understanding of the terms 
“unreasonable” and “probable cause,” and the Framers’ intentions 
regarding the scope of the Amendment—only tangentially abut this 
Article’s main claims. Instead, this Part demonstrates that, far from 
being insulated from public view, searches and seizures were 
quintessentially public proceedings, and their very openness laid bare 
abuses of power that required democratic oversight. It was the invention 
of warrantless policing, in lockstep with technological change, that 
facilitated secrecy. 
                                                 
161. Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 
70. 
162. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
163. See generally WILLIAM CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL 
MEANING lxvi (2009) (“Many kinds of searches and seizures were unreasonable within the original 
meaning of the amendment, not just general warrants.”); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment 
First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994) (arguing, generally, that the Fourth Amendment 
was intended to require reasonableness, not warrants); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the 
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 398 (1974) (arguing that the effort to reconstruct Fourth 
Amendment history is “illusory”); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 
98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 551 (2000) (“[T]he Framers did not address warrantless intrusions at all in 
the Fourth Amendment or in the earlier state provisions; thus, they never anticipated that 
‘unreasonable’ might be read as a standard for warrantless intrusions.”); Tracey Maclin & Julia 
Mirabella, Framing the Fourth, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1049 (2011) (placing Cuddihy’s contribution in 
the context of scholarly debates between Amar, Davies, and others); Carol S. Steiker, Second 
Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 825 (1994) (“[I]t is perfectly appropriate 
for twentieth-century judges to forge a new connection between reasonableness and warrants and to 
create a new constitutional remedy in light of our post-colonial history.”). 
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A. Searches as “Public Spectacle” 
When the Framers demanded that searches be reasonable and that 
warrants be limited in scope, they were responding to the common law 
legacy of unfettered power of discretionary searches.164 These concerns 
were tangible: the “harsh experience of householders having their doors 
hammered open by magistrates and writ-bearing agents of the crown” 
gave rise to the principles set forth in the Fourth Amendment that limited 
the government’s ability to search.165 The “sacrosanct interest” in 
privacy in the home required heightened protections from searches.166 A 
vivid 1788 commentary called on readers to “imagine the dreadful giant 
Congress storming our domestic castles by warrants both general and 
special, and searching our cellars, garrets, bed-chambers and closets,” 
admonishing them not to be “such gentle doves as to let any cormorants 
rifle your nests, snatch the victuals from your little ones, and tear the 
covers from your beloved mates.”167 “Open your front door, ran the 
argument, and the extent of federal invasion will be infinite. Kitchens 
and closets, cellars and garrets, bedchambers and trunks, desks and 
letters, petticoats, and pockets: none will remain inviolate to scrutiny.”168 
The 1766 “Malcom affair,” which one scholar has called “the most 
famous search in colonial America,” exemplified the type of domestic 
intrusion that the Framers wished to prevent.169 On the authority of a 
writ of assistance issued a year prior, two customs officers entered 
Malcom’s house to search for smuggled brandy and liquor. Despite 
claiming innocence, Malcom “opened every place in his house that his 
visitors wished to see, including his wood shed and two cellars.”170 
When Malcom refused the officers’ demand that Malcom open a third 
cellar compartment, the customs officers called in reinforcements to 
break in: Malcom then armed himself with pistols and a sword and 
threatened to kill the searchers.171 The searchers left, then returned with 
                                                 
164. Davies, supra note 163, at 578 (“Common-law authorities repeatedly gave a consistent 
reason for condemning general warrants: if such warrants had been permitted, they would have 
conferred on ordinary officers discretionary authority to arrest or even to search houses.”). 
165. William Cuddihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A Man’s House Was Not His Castle: Origins of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37 WM. & MARY Q. 371, 372 (1980). 
166. Davies, supra note 163, at 642. 
167. CUDDIHY, supra note 163, at 679. 
168. Id. at 766. 
169. Id. at 496. 
170. Id. at 497. 
171. Id. 
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a specific search warrant, only to find that Malcom had fortified his 
house, locking “every window, door, and gate.”172 The customs officers 
began calling upon bystanders to help them break in, but to no avail.173 
“Many in the crowd sympathized with Malcom and angrily refused to 
help; others were willing to assist only after he had been subdued.”174 
The Malcom affair also illustrates another critical aspect of searches 
in the colonial era: they occurred in public, in real time and space. 
Indeed, it was precisely the public nature of the Malcom search, the sight 
of the customs officers bellowing at Malcom’s home-turned-castle, that 
attracted scrutiny and resistance from passersby who refused to help. 
Likewise, legislators in the colonial era were hostile to other measures 
that would tend to expedite searches and insulate them from public view, 
repudiating nocturnal searches and no-knock entry.175 These limitations 
on the power to search ensured not only that individuals were protected 
from unlawful, abusive searches, but also that searches were executed in 
daylight, perhaps with neighbors and curious bystanders watching. The 
very public nature of searches and seizures, coupled with the abusive 
practice of general and discretionary searches, fostered the population’s 
distrust, antipathy, and ultimately obstruction of colonial officers who 
undertook them: “[t]arred and feathered customs officers, cowed 
magistrates, and mob ‘liberations’ of seizures flooded newspapers and 
correspondence.”176 
Searches were transparent in another way: after a search was 
completed and property seized, an inventory was required to be left with 
the individual searched.177 In the seminal case of Wilkes v. Wood,178 a 
dissenting printer filed an action for trespass after the government 
searched and seized all of his papers; a chief objection to the 
unreasonableness of the blanket search was that the searchers had failed 
                                                 
172. Id. at 498. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 499. In the wake of the Malcom affair, Sir Francis Bernard, Governor of 
Massachusetts, sent depositions to England to “remind Westminster yet again of Boston’s 
incorrigible turbulence”—and to prompt Parliament to enact statutory permission for writs of 
assistance searches in the colonies. M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 447–54 (1978).  
175. CUDDIHY, supra note 163, at 660–61. 
176. Id. at 511. 
177. In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 573 (8th 
Cir. 1988) (“[A]lthough the process of issuing search warrants has traditionally not been conducted 
in an open fashion, search warrant applications and receipts are routinely filed with the clerk of 
court without seal.”). This requirement is mirrored in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41. 
178. (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489. 
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to leave an inventory behind.179 At a minimum, the logic ran, the 
government had to inform the target of a search and seizure of what had 
been taken. During the founding era, however, executed warrants were 
“retained by the constable,” not filed with a central clerk’s office for all 
to see.180 
The law of search and seizure was also itself made public: William 
Cuddihy reports that, in the wake of the revolution, “practically all” 
legislation restricting searches and seizures was published, making the 
“major developments in search and seizure readily accessible.”181 Yet 
these publications provoked scant response from the public, a fact that 
Cuddihy attributes, in part, to the traumatic effects of plunder during the 
war: “[w]hen heavily armed men kicked in the door in the dead of night 
and demanded to be fed, the persons behind that door reacted with terror 
and outrage, not with arguments for specific search warrants or 
evaluations of probable cause.”182 
Given this background, it is perhaps unsurprising that the framers of 
the Fourth Amendment retained a deeply physical, place-based 
conception of what ought to be protected from the unfettered, general 
power to search homes and seize property. In order to prevent law 
enforcement from using general warrants, the framers chose to require a 
warrant to specify the “place” to be searched.183 Spatial limits were 
integral to the Fourth Amendment’s restrictions on the power to search 
and seize. 
Yet the framing generation also recognized that physical searches 
implicated ephemeral ideas. In crying out for protection from unfettered 
home searches, commentators “expressed concern for ‘the most delicate 
parts of our families,’ for ‘most discreet recesses,’ ‘private papers,’ and 
‘private concerns,’ in short, for privacy.”184 The special protections from 
                                                 
179. Id. at 498 (“The defendants claimed a right, under precedents, to force persons houses, break 
open escrutores, seize their papers, &c. upon a general warrant, where no inventory is made of the 
things thus taken away, and where no offenders names are specified in the warrant, and therefore a 
discretionary power given to messengers to search wherever their suspicions may chance to fall.”). 
180. Davies, supra note 163, at 642 n.257. 
181. CUDDIHY, supra note 163, at 666. 
182. Id. at 667. 
183. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Cuddihy observes that the contemporary definition of “place” was a 
“particular portion of space,” concluding that by limiting warrants to one “place,” Congress 
intended to “restrict the resulting search not only to a single building, but, if possible, to a segment 
of it or to a unique area of space, even if it did not constitute a fully enclosed structure.” CUDDIHY, 
supra note 163, at 742. 
184. Id. at 766; see also Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 397 (2008) 
(quoting Justice Brandeis’s dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 
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search that the Framers conferred upon “papers” also emanated partly 
from the English history of using search and seizure to control religious 
and political dissent.185 William Stuntz also emphasizes the historical 
salience of the seditious libel cases of Entick v. Carrington186 and 
Wilkes, two “classic First Amendment cases in a system with no First 
Amendment.”187 In short, the Fourth Amendment was rooted in the 
public backlash to abusive, discretionary physical searches of homes and 
private places, but was equally intended to protect against invasion of 
the intangible interests of privacy and expressive and religious freedom 
as against physical intrusions. 
B. Secrecy, Compulsion, and Coercion Under the Fourth Amendment 
The presumption that searches were public, and publicly accountable, 
continued into the nineteenth century. Most early Fourth Amendment 
cases continued to involve open, physical searches, not secret ones. As a 
result, the early doctrine tended to emphasize how the government’s use 
of force and compulsion—factors that were tangible to those who were 
searched—rendered home searches unreasonable. For example, in Boyd 
v. United States,188 the Court distinguished between the “search and 
seizure of a man’s private papers, or the compulsory production of them, 
for the purpose of using them in evidence against him in a criminal 
case,” and the search and seizure of goods that were contraband.189 The 
Boyd Court did not contemplate a secret search, but a compelled 
disclosure of papers; accordingly, it found that “any forcible and 
compulsory extortion of a man’s own testimony or of his private papers 
to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods,” is 
prohibited by the Constitution.190 
In two later cases, the Court rejected secret, warrantless searches, 
even when they involved no outright force or overt compulsion. In 1914, 
                                                 
(1928) (the Framers “sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and 
their sensations”)). 
185. CUDDIHY, supra note 163, at 55–60 (detailing how English monarchs targeted “seditious” 
and “heretical” religious books and manuscripts for searches and seizures after the Reformation and 
the Restoration and well into the mid-seventeenth century). 
186. (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807; 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029.  
187. William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 403 
(1995). But see Davies, supra note 163, at 573 n.57 (claiming that Stuntz erred in concluding that 
search warrants at the framing were rare). 
188. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
189. Id. at 623. 
190. Id. at 630 (emphasis added). 
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the Court considered in Weeks v. United States191 a physical search of a 
suspect’s home while he was absent.192 The defendant had been arrested 
at the train station where he worked. While he was under arrest, the 
police went to his house, located—with a neighbor’s assistance—the 
spare key, and let themselves in to seize some of his books and papers.193 
Later that day, the police returned with the marshal; a neighbor let them 
in and they searched again.194 The defendant petitioned for the return of 
his property, and the Court refused to sanction the search, holding, by 
implication, that a court has no authority “to retain for the purposes of 
evidence the letters and correspondence of the accused, seized in his 
house in his absence and without his authority, by a United States 
Marshal holding no warrant for his arrest and none for the search of his 
premises.”195 
In Gouled v. United States,196 the Supreme Court explicitly 
recognized that “the secret taking or abstraction, without force, . . . of a 
paper writing of evidential value only belonging to one suspected of a 
crime and from the house or office of such a person” constituted a 
Fourth Amendment “search.”197 Gouled involved a conspiracy to 
defraud the United States through contracts for the provision of clothing 
and equipment.198 Suspicious of dishonest conduct, the “Intelligence 
Department” of the U.S. Army asked Cohen, who was both a private in 
the Department and a business acquaintance of Gouled’s, to 
investigate.199 Pretending to pay a “friendly call,” Cohen stole several 
documents from Gouled’s office in his absence.200 Six months later, 
agents of the Department of Justice secured warrants permitting them to 
search Gouled’s office for “letters, papers, documents, and writings” 
relating to the conspiracy.201 Gouled was aware of the warrants, but 
                                                 
191. 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
192. Id. at 386. 
193. Id. 
194. Id.  
195. Id. at 393 (emphasis added). Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States also presented a 
situation in which the defendants’ office was searched in their absence and without a warrant while 
they were detained in custody, and the Court once again rebuked the government. 251 U.S. 385 
(1920). 
196. 255 U.S. 298 (1921). 
197. Id. at 305, abrogated by Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (emphasis added). 
198. Id. at 304. 
199. Gouled v. United States, 264 F. 839, 839 (2d Cir. 1920). 
200. Id. at 839. 
201. Id. at 840. 
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according to the Second Circuit, which certified the question to the 
Supreme Court, “Gouled did not know what Cohen had done” until 
Cohen testified before the grand jury.202 
Once again, the Court rejected the notion that “[e]ither actual force or 
legal compulsion” were necessary ingredients for an unconstitutional 
search.203 Recognizing that forcible entry would render a resulting 
search unreasonable, the Court reasoned that “it is impossible to 
successfully contend that a like search and seizure would be a reasonable 
one if only admission were obtained by stealth instead of by force or 
coercion.”204 The owner’s “security and privacy” would be “as much 
invaded” in both cases, the Court found, and held that whether law 
enforcement enters a home or office “by stealth, or through social 
acquaintance, or in the guise of a business call, and whether the owner 
be present or not when he enters, any search and seizure subsequently 
and secretly made in his absence” is proscribed by the Fourth 
Amendment.205 
C. Eavesdropping and Wiretapping 
The development of wiretapping and eavesdropping weakened the 
Court’s resolve that secret searches were equally off-limits as forcible 
ones. In 1928, the Olmstead Court held that eavesdropping on telephone 
conversations, without a physical trespass, implicated no Fourth 
Amendment rights. Recharacterizing the “stealthy entrance” in Gouled 
as “the equivalent to an entry by force,” the Court rejected the idea that 
the Fourth Amendment could also be violated in intangible ways, 
dismissing the eavesdropping as representative “only of voluntary 
conversations secretly overheard.”206 The Gouled decision, the Court 
said, represented the “extreme limit” of the Fourth Amendment.207 
In dissent, Justice Brandeis recognized that new technology made 
secret searches as easy to accomplish as those achieved by force or 
compulsion. Just so, Justice Brandeis argued that the government’s 
possession of “[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means” of searching and 
                                                 
202. Id. 
203. Gouled, 255 U.S. at 299. 
204. Id. at 305. 
205. Id. at 306. 
206. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463–64 (1928). The Court appeared to shy away 
from the “sweeping” results of Weeks and its progeny, which had resulted in the outright exclusion 
of evidence from criminal proceedings rather than the imposition of ex post liability. Id. at 463. 
207. Id. 
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seizing made the Court’s focus on tangible harms irrelevant; government 
agents need no longer resort to “stretching upon the rack.”208 
Nor did Justice Brandeis accept the Court’s assertion that only visible, 
tangible searches warranted constitutional protections, instead quoting 
the dissenting opinion from the Ninth Circuit: “[t]rue the one is visible, 
the other invisible; the one is tangible, the other intangible; the one is 
sealed, and the other unsealed; but these are distinctions without a 
difference.”209 
Following Olmstead, Congress recognized that even warrantless, 
secret, and—in some sense—intangible surveillance of conversations 
implicated civil liberties. In the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 
Congress prohibited law enforcement from wiretapping conversations.210 
But that statutory prohibition was frequently ignored; indeed, the 
Department of Justice interpreted the Act to permit interception, “so 
long as no disclosure of the content outside the Department is made.”211 
From 1928 until 1967, in other words, no warrant or judicial order was 
required for electronic surveillance. As a result, during that period law 
enforcement operated in the dark, almost entirely without oversight by 
the courts or the public.212 
D. “Necessarily Secret” Electronic Searches Emerge 
In the 1960s, the Court began once again to shift its approach to the 
constitutional problems raised by secret, warrantless communications 
surveillance. In Berger, the Court found fault with the New York 
eavesdropping statute’s failure to provide for notice to the target of a 
wiretap, even as the majority conceded that the statute’s “success 
depends on secrecy.”213 Subsequently, the Court overtly repudiated the 
“trespass-based” theory of the Fourth Amendment in its 1967 ruling in 
Katz v. United States214 and held that electronic surveillance, in the 
absence of physical trespass, still constituted a “search.”215 
                                                 
208. Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
209. Id. at 475. 
210. See Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 
ALA. L. REV. 9, 26 (2004). 
211. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 127 (1967) (White, J., dissenting). 
212. Freiwald, supra note 210, at 26.  
213. Berger, 388 U.S. at 60. In dissent, Justice Black lambasted the majority’s “notice” 
requirement as a “fantastic suggestion” that was fundamentally at odds with the fact that “secrecy is 
an essential, indeed a definitional, element of eavesdropping.” Id. at 86 (Black, J., dissenting). 
214. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
215. Id. at 353. 
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In recognizing that the Fourth Amendment attaches to telephonic 
communications, the Court nonetheless distinguished eavesdropping 
from physical searches, finding that judicially “authorized electronic 
surveillance” required no prior notice.216 The Court rejected the Fourth 
Amendment’s “knock and announce” requirement as inapplicable to 
eavesdropping, just as “officers need not announce their purpose before 
conducting an otherwise authorized search if such an announcement 
would provoke the escape of the suspect or the destruction of critical 
evidence.”217 Katz ushered in a new era of judicially sanctioned secret 
searches that had previously been unregulated, bringing wiretapping and 
electronic surveillance under the supervision of magistrates. 
In response to Katz and Berger, Congress enacted the Wiretap Act in 
1968. The Act “[w]ork[ed] from the hypothesis that any wiretapping and 
electronic surveillance legislation” should respond to the concerns raised 
in Katz and Berger, including the requirement of notice to targets.218 The 
Department of Justice recognized that Berger and Katz “established that 
notice must be served on all parties to intercepted communications,”219 
but that prior notice was impracticable in the electronic surveillance 
context. Because ex post notice was likewise required under “existing 
search warrant practice[s],” Congress substituted a requirement that law 
enforcement serve an inventory on the target of a wiretap after the 
interception.220 Conceding that, under certain circumstances, the 
government might be able to postpone notice “almost indefinitely,” the 
Senate nonetheless embraced the principle that subjects of surveillance 
would be informed, after the fact, that their communications had been 
intercepted.221 This “principle of postuse notice,” the Senate noted, not 
only guaranteed that surveillance “must eventually become known at 
least to the subject,” but also performed an important public oversight 
function to “insure the community that the techniques are reasonably 
employed.”222 
The Wiretap Act also, however, codified a presumption of secrecy. 
This requirement stemmed from the same reasons eavesdropping 
warranted careful judicial oversight: it was intrusive. The Act set out 
                                                 
216. Id. at 355 n.16 (1967). 
217. Id.  
218. S. REP. NO. 1097, at 2163 (1968). 
219. 114 CONG. REC. 6214 (May 23, 1968) (emphasis in original). 
220. S. REP. NO. 1097, at 2194. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
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explicit requirements for applications to intercept communications and 
provided that applications made, orders granted, and recordings 
authorized under the act “shall be sealed by the judge” and disclosed 
“only upon a showing of good cause.”223 
While Katz expanded the coverage of the Fourth Amendment, the 
Court simultaneously broadened law enforcement’s power to search by 
dismantling the “mere evidence” rule, which had historically limited law 
enforcement’s ability to search for evidence unless it constituted an 
instrumentality, fruit of crime, or contraband.224 In Warden v. Hayden,225 
only six months prior to Katz, the Court had repudiated that 
longstanding distinction, upholding the admission of a defendant’s “cap, 
jacket, and trousers” as evidence in his trial for robbery.226 This rejection 
of the “mere evidence” rule laid the groundwork for police to search for 
evidence of crime, even when it is “in the private files of a person not 
suspected of involvement in any criminal activity.”227 
Subsequently, the Court adopted the rule that an individual can have 
“no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns 
over to third parties.”228 In 1976, the Court held in United States v. 
Miller229 that a bank customer had no expectation of privacy, and thus no 
Fourth Amendment protection, regarding depositor records held by his 
bank.230 The defendant in Miller not only lacked a legal right to 
challenge a subpoena issued to a third party, but also was not entitled to 
notice of that subpoena. In dissent, Justice Brennan characterized this 
lack of notice as a “fatal constitutional defect.”231 
The implications for telephone records were immediate. Two years 
after Miller, the D.C. Circuit held that reporters were not entitled to 
                                                 
223. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1968); see also Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 
Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801, 82 Stat. 211 (2013) (“To safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the 
interception of wire or oral communications where none of the parties to the communication has 
consented to the interception should be allowed only when authorized by a court of competent 
jurisdiction and should remain under the control and supervision of the authorizing court.”).  
224. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300 (1967). 
225. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
226. Id. at 296. 
227. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
228. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 
435, 442–44 (1976)). 
229. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
230. Id. at 442–43. 
231. Id. at 448 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 
743 (1984) (precedent “disable[s] respondents from arguing that notice of subpoenas issued to third 
parties is necessary to allow a target to prevent an unconstitutional search or seizure of his papers”). 
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notice before subpoenas were issued for telephone records reflecting 
communications with sources.232 The following year, the Supreme Court 
held in Smith v. Maryland233 that no search warrant was required for pen 
registers because, regardless of whether the petitioner wished to keep the 
“contents” of his conversations private, he had no expectation of privacy 
in the phone numbers he dialed.234 
Taken together, Katz, Hayden, and the third-party doctrine 
substantially altered the constitutional protections against unfettered law 
enforcement access to telecommunications records. Katz made it 
possible for law enforcement to obtain search warrants in order to listen 
in on conversations. Hayden legitimized the use of searches that targeted 
even those not suspected of committing a crime. And Smith and Miller 
made plain that targets were not entitled to notice of the electronic 
surveillance that was occurring. None of these cases took account of the 
important functions that notice performed by keeping the government 
accountable in criminal investigations, both to defendants and to the 
public. 
E. Statutory Secrecy Provisions in the Third-Party Context 
In 1986, when Congress enacted the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (ECPA), it reformed Title III and regulated the new kinds of 
electronic surveillance occurring under the third-party doctrine. While 
the Wiretap Act regulated real-time acquisition of communications 
content, the Pen/Trap Statute regulated real-time acquisition of 
communications metadata using pen registers, trap and trace devices, 
and tracking devices.235 As the name suggests, the SCA regulated 
government acquisition of communications in storage, including both 
content and metadata.236 All three authorities set out frameworks for the 
government to apply for court orders authorizing the acquisition of 
electronic communications information from service providers. 
Like the Wiretap Act, the Pen/Trap Statute codified secrecy 
requirements, albeit with unclear congressional motivations. The 1985 
                                                 
232. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1044 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978) (“[A] person has no Fourth Amendment basis for challenging subpoenas directed at the 
business records of a third party, and, hence, has no right to notice of such subpoenas.”). 
233. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
234. Id. at 743–44 (emphasis in original). 
235. The USA PATRIOT Act amended the Pen/Trap Statute to clarify that the government could 
use this authority to collect “dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information” of “electronic 
communication[s].” See Susan Freiwald, supra note 210, at 49. 
236. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012). 
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versions of the bill from the House and the Senate were silent on judicial 
sealing requirements and provided that “the person owning or leasing the 
line” affected by the pen register may be able to disclose the existence of 
the order “60 days after its removal.”237 In addition, the Act provided 
that the judge who issued the order should notify the affected person 
within ninety days after the termination of a pen register.238 In the final 
version, however, these provisions were absent; instead, Congress 
required that an order be sealed and the recipient gagged “until 
otherwise ordered by the court.”239 
At the same time that Congress adopted these secrecy requirements 
for electronic searches, the Fourth Amendment presumption against 
secret physical searches remained intact.240 Even when the government 
executed “sneak and peek” warrants, which permit agents to enter a 
premises to gather information without leaving notice or an inventory, it 
was required to give advance or contemporaneous notice to the target of 
the search unless it demonstrates “reasonable necessity for the delay.”241 
Even if notice might be delayed, sneak and peek warrants required 
“notice of the search within a reasonable time after the covert entry.”242 
These safeguards were necessary because, as the Ninth Circuit put it, 
“surreptitious searches and seizures of intangibles strike at the very heart 
of the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.”243 
In contrast, by substituting gag orders for notice requirements in the 
electronic context, Congress created a norm of secrecy without historical 
precedent. Although, as the Court recognized in Berger and Katz, 
electronic surveillance did not require prior or contemporaneous notice, 
ex post notice was still required. And in enacting the Wiretap Act, 
Congress recognized that “postuse notice” performed not only essential 
due process functions, but also served to keep the government 
accountable to the public. By contrast, the enactment of the Pen/Trap 
Statute included neither provisions for notice to targets nor for public 
accountability. The result was that the new third-party ecosystem 
                                                 
237. H.R. 3378, 90th Cong. § 3123 (1985). 
238. Id. 
239. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(d) (2010). 
240. John Kent Walker, Jr., Covert Searches, 39 STAN. L. REV. 545, 554 (1987) (arguing that the 
extension of the warrant requirement to electronic surveillance represented a shift toward protection 
of privacy from protection of property). 
241. United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1337 (2d Cir. 1990). 
242. Id. 
243. United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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dramatically departed from the longstanding historical tradition of open, 
publicly accountable searches and seizures.244 
F. First Amendment Implications of Fourth Amendment History 
This Fourth Amendment story has deep implications for how we 
understand the historical inquiry through the prism of the First 
Amendment right of access. The First Amendment requires courts to 
dive deep to understand whether a certain type of document or 
proceeding was historically open. But the historical experience of 
openness for search warrants, and the recognition of the importance of 
transparency and notice in the electronic surveillance context, suggest 
several different appropriate avenues for inquiry. 
First, the experience of open, public searches at common law and 
long thereafter might suggest that searches and seizures are themselves 
“government proceedings” subject to a First Amendment right of access. 
Courts have recognized a historical tradition of public access to 
government proceedings that are “open to all comers” or are “fully open 
events.”245 The broad experience of public oversight, observation, and 
participation in searches and seizures strongly suggests that there is a 
long tradition of openness. Indeed, to the extent the Supreme Court 
addressed secret searches at all, it appeared to find them constitutionally 
dubious—that is, until technological change created a need for secrecy 
by facilitating eavesdropping, wiretapping, and other electronic 
surveillance. 
Second, a history of closure that results from a statutory bar on 
openness does not, in and of itself, suggest that closure is either 
normatively desirable or constitutional. The fact that a statute permits or 
requires closure does not necessarily reflect a congressional belief that 
closure is either “consistent with historical practice or a significant 
departure.”246 As a result, the Tenth Circuit has suggested that looking to 
a history of closure that results from a statutory authorization of secrecy 
                                                 
244. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 802–03 
(1994) (contrasting secret electronic surveillance, without notice, with physical warrants that 
“would be served on the owner or occupant of the searched premises, or left there, giving the target 
clear notice of what had been searched or seized, and when”). 
245. Cal. First Amendment Coal. v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 2002) (characterizing 
executions as historically open). 
246. United States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 237 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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is “obviously not required (and perhaps entirely inappropriate) as part of 
the ‘experience’ factor of Press-Enterprise II.”247 
It follows that courts ought to scrutinize the statutory sealing and 
secrecy requirements in the Pen/Trap Statute and the SCA, which 
purport to justify secrecy where it appears that in fact none was intended 
or required. The Supreme Court had recognized, in Berger and Katz, that 
while electronic searches necessarily had to take place in secret, ex post 
notice was an essential element of preventing government abuses. 
Likewise, in enacting the Wiretap Act, Congress had found that “postuse 
notice” served to keep the public informed of government activity. 
Against this background, the enactment of broad secrecy provisions in 
1986 appears historically unfounded, and the legislative history offers no 
explanation. 
Finally, a history of closure, by itself, cannot suggest that closure is 
constitutionally proper. The history of electronic surveillance orders 
from the 1986 enactment of the ECPA until the present is largely one of 
secrecy created by legislation, not evidence of a long history of 
justifiable closure. And, indeed, the prevalence of secrecy actually itself 
impedes the historical analysis; so few courts have ruled on the record 
about the propriety of sealing electronic surveillance orders that the 
historical record is quite thin.248 Against this background, it is equally 
likely that closure reflects law enforcement’s propensity toward 
secrecy.249 Although a “tradition of accessibility implies the favorable 
judgment of experience,”250 the inverse is not necessarily true. 
III. THE LOGIC OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 
SURVEILLANCE 
The second element of the Press-Enterprise II framework requires 
consideration of “whether public access plays a significant positive role 
                                                 
247. United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246, 1258 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 281 S.E.2d 915, 925 (Va. 1981) (finding that a facially-valid 
statute authorizing closure may be constitutional on its face, but “[u]nless the standard for closure 
previously discussed has been established in accordance with” adequate procedures, it would be 
unconstitutional as applied). 
248. See In re Sealing & Non-Disclosure of Pen/Trap/2703(d) Orders, 562 F. Supp. 2d 876, 887 
(S.D. Tex. 2008) (“No court has yet considered whether electronic surveillance orders fall within 
the ambit of the First Amendment’s right of public access.”). 
249. In re The Search of Fair Fin. v. United States, 692 F.3d 424, 431 (“[W]e do not interpret the 
fact that the government may in some instances allow documents filed after the execution of the 
search warrant to become public to be evidence of an historical tradition of accessibility to them.”). 
250. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980). 
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in the functioning of the particular process in question.”251 Transparency 
as a proposed remedy for law enforcement misconduct is not new. 
Access to documents filed in connection with applications for electronic 
surveillance plays a positive role by facilitating public understanding of 
surveillance law and technology, holding law enforcement and 
prosecutors accountable for uses and abuses of surveillance tools and 
methods, and making available to the public basic data about the 
frequency with which police use surveillance authorities. 
A. Awareness of Surveillance Technology 
Secret surveillance techniques sometimes provide the linchpin of 
investigations. As police acquire and test out new surveillance 
techniques, “disclosure of a search performed in one criminal case risks 
exposing the new technique writ large, both to other targets of similar 
investigations but also to the public generally.”252 This is a legitimate 
concern, but a narrow one: it may be the case that the police have a 
compelling interest in maintaining secrecy with regard to some 
surveillance techniques, but it is deeply implausible that every pen 
register deserves eternal protection from public view.253 Moreover, 
recognizing that court orders are public documents does not require 
police to lay bare their complete arsenal; they may continue to keep from 
public view sensitive tools and techniques that they may use without 
judicial approval.254  Others might see this as an example of just the sort 
of illegitimate “police exceptionalism” that fails to treat police “as the 
executive officials they are, subject to the same basic requisites of 
democracy—namely, transparent, publicly accountable, ex ante 
regulation.”255 
Transparency is doubly important in the surveillance context because 
warrantless requests to service providers frequently implicate novel 
technologies and legal theories. In 2005, the federal government sought 
an order under the SCA in the Eastern District of New York that would 
permit the ongoing, prospective disclosure of cell site location 
                                                 
251. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). 
252. Toomey & Kaufman, supra note 22, at 895. 
253. Cf. Joint Status Report, supra note 122. 
254. But see Catherine Crump, Surveillance Policy Making by Procurement, 91 WASH. L. REV. 
1595 (2016) (discussing how federal procurement circumvents local accountability and oversight 
mechanisms for police surveillance). 
255. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 23, at 1833.  
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information.256 Magistrate Judge Orenstein demurred, concluding that 
the government may not lawfully obtain an order authorizing the 
prospective acquisition of location information unless it demonstrates 
probable cause.257 As Judge Orenstein explained, the Communications 
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) explicitly barred 
telecommunications carriers from including location information 
pursuant to pen register and trap and trace authority.258 Judge Orenstein 
rejected the government’s proposal that it could fuse the statutory 
authority to conduct prospective surveillance under the Pen/Trap Statute 
with its authority to collect historical cell site location information under 
the SCA without impermissibly flouting CALEA. 
The same year, across the East River, Magistrate Judge Gorenstein 
issued an opinion authorizing precisely the relief that Judge Orenstein 
had declined to grant.259 Law enforcement’s “hybrid theory,” which 
marries the statutory authority to obtain location information under the 
SCA with the authority to obtain prospective information under the 
Pen/Trap Statute, created a split among courts.260 
The so-called “encryption debate” raises additional questions 
regarding the government’s interpretation of its authority to compel 
assistance under the Pen/Trap Statute. In 2013, the government obtained 
an order requiring Lavabit, an encrypted email provider, to place a 
pen/trap device on its system to capture incoming and outgoing traffic 
on an encrypted email account; Lavabit claimed it could not comply and 
refused to produce its SSL keys, even after the government obtained a 
search warrant.261 Eventually, Lavabit permitted the government to 
install the pen/trap device it sought, “[b]ut, without the encryption keys, 
much of the information transmitted to and from Lavabit’s servers 
                                                 
256. In re Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 384 F. Supp. 2d 562, 564 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), on 
reconsideration sub nom. In re Application of the United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the 
Use of a Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device & (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. &/or 
Cell Site Info., 396 F. Supp. 2d 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). In the alternative, the government sought the 
same information under the Pen/Trap Statute. 
257. Id. 
258. Id. at 565. 
259. In re Application of United States for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomms. Records & 
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(finding that a decision that proposed relief was precluded by statute “would constitute a directive 
that cell site information was not obtainable by any mechanism at all”). 
260. See Patricia L. Bellia, Designing Surveillance Law, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293, 336 (2011); 
Timothy Stapleton, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act and Cell Location Data: Is the 
Whole More than the Sum of Its Parts?, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 383, 408 (2007) (discussing split 
between Orenstein and Gorenstein opinions). 
261. In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 281 (4th Cir. 2014). 
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remained encrypted, indecipherable, and useless.”262 The government 
explicitly sought to “avoid litigating the issue” of whether Lavabit was 
required to turn over its keys under the Pen/Trap Statute’s provision 
requiring “technical assistance.”263 To date, that question has not been 
resolved in a public ruling. 
The Lavabit example illustrates the urgent need to understand how the 
Pen/Trap Statute and the SCA apply to encrypted communications 
services that—by design—cannot provide detailed information about 
customers or usage. In two recent drug distribution cases, the 
government has obtained orders authorizing the installation of a pen/trap 
device to capture call and messaging details from WhatsApp, a 
messaging app that uses internet data instead of a wireless network.264 In 
one case, the court ordered that, if WhatsApp was not already “equipped 
with a caller identification option,” it must add that feature.265 In the 
other case, the court ordered that if WhatsApp “cannot comply,” the 
government could “install and use its own pen register and trap and trace 
devices” pursuant to the Pen/Trap Statute to obtain information 
including “date, duration, and timestamp of communication,” as well as 
IP addresses, which can be used to discern location.266 
In contrast, Apple’s iMessage appears to be able to provide “query 
logs” in response to pen/trap orders that include dates, times, and IP 
addresses, but it is unable to provide real-time responses or to confirm 
that a message was actually sent or received.267 Signal, another 
encrypted messaging app, appears not to store any information about 
user communications other than “the date and time a user registered with 
                                                 
262. Id. at 283. 
263. Id. 
264. See Application, In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the 
Installation & Use of a Pen Register Device &/or a Trap & Trace Device &/or Caller Identification 
Option Device on Tel. No. 1-614-369-5045, United States v. Pen Register, No. 2:16-mj-00254-
NMK (S.D. Ohio May 26, 2016), ECF No. 1; Application, In re Application of the United States for 
an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device, United 
States v. WhatsApp Inc., No. 6:15-cm-60087-EFM-1 (D. Kan. Sept. 16, 2015), ECF No. 1. 
265. Order to Service Provider at 2, In re Application of the United States for an Order 
Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register Device &/or a Trap & Trace Device &/or 
Caller Identification Option Device on Tel. No. 1-614-369-5045, United States v. Pen Register, No. 
2:16-mj-00254-NMK (S.D. Ohio Sept. 16, 2015), ECF No. 3. 
266. Order as to WhatsApp Inc., United States v. WhatsApp Inc., No. 6:15-cm-60087-EFM-1 (D. 
Kan. May 26, 2016), ECF No. 2. 
267. Sam Biddle, Apple Logs Your iMessage Contacts — And May Share Them with Police, 
INTERCEPT (Sept. 28, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://bit.ly/2d9K3nF [https://perma.cc/WPQ4-5LS9]. 
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Signal and the last date of a user’s connectivity to the Signal service.”268 
It is unclear what Signal could or would produce if it were required to 
install a pen/trap in order to collect, in real time, additional information 
about user communications. 
These examples illustrate that the government’s authority under the 
Pen/Trap Statute to compel encrypted services to turn over keys or 
collect additional user information remains unclear. Moreover, as the 
government seeks to compel encrypted services to comply with court 
orders in ways that are legally and technologically new, it does so 
behind closed doors—without even explaining its assertions of authority. 
B. Understanding Interpretations of Statutory Authority 
In light of the evident difficulties courts experience as they grapple 
with how to apply old law to new technologies, enhancing access to 
records reflecting the government’s legal reasoning and statutory 
interpretations would “play[] a particularly significant positive role in 
the actual functioning of the process” of issuing surveillance orders.269 
Given the proliferation of encrypted messaging services that promise to 
be more secure than traditional electronic communications, it is 
particularly striking that the courts have been so silent on the application 
of surveillance authorities to the acquisition of communications 
metadata in these new settings. Despite the salience of these questions, 
there is very little information about how law enforcement actually 
interprets and uses its authority that is available to Congress, the courts, 
or the public. 
By way of contrast, the public has had access to some rulings on 
electronic surveillance. For example, the disagreement between Judges 
Orenstein and Gorenstein regarding the government’s ability to acquire 
prospective location information pursuant to the Pen/Trap Statute is 
distinctive in part because it was so public. Likewise, several courts have 
addressed in published opinions whether the Pen/Trap Statute authorizes 
the government to obtain “post-cut-through dialed digits,” the numbers 
that one might dial after an initial connection is complete, which may 
include social security numbers, account numbers, numeric voicemail 
passwords, or extensions.270 And several magistrate judges have publicly 
                                                 
268. Grand Jury Subpoena for Signal User Data, Eastern District of Virginia, SIGNAL (Oct. 4, 
2016), http://bit.ly/2dYcs2M [https://perma.cc/2NT4-6AJU]. 
269. Press Enterprise II, 478 US 1, 11–12 (1986). 
270. In re United States, 622 F. Supp. 2d 411, 412 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (listing cases). 
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rejected efforts to obtain warrants and court orders authorizing 
overbroad electronic searches.271 
However, it remains fairly unusual for magistrate judges to publish 
decisions regarding government applications for surveillance. Opacity is 
structurally embedded deep within the courts: magistrate judges, the 
federal courts’ “worker bees,” tend not to write as many published 
opinions as Article III judges.272 Partly as a result, in many areas in 
which the government proposes novel constructions of statutory 
authority to support new investigative methods, “[t]he courts and the 
Government would all benefit from additional case-law 
development.”273 As one court recognized, “the best way to test the limit 
of the Government’s authority may be through developed records, trial 
court opinions on suppression motions, and appellate review.”274 
By informing the public about how the government conducts 
electronic communications surveillance, release of surveillance records 
could also foster a better social understanding of technology and enrich 
the debate about the meaning of Fourth Amendment protections in the 
information age. As the Fifth Circuit has recognized, “technological 
changes can alter societal expectations of privacy.”275 But technological 
change must be publicly known in order for social expectations of 
privacy to shift accordingly. Indeed, keeping secret information about 
the scope of the government’s surveillance authorities only fuels the 
argument that users are unaware that they are “voluntarily” or 
“knowingly convey[ing]” information to third party providers.276 
Presumptive unsealing of electronic surveillance orders at the 
conclusion of an investigation would also permit the public to better 
understand the government’s position on its statutory authority. 
Recognizing a right of access to post-investigation surveillance materials 
                                                 
271. See Ann E. Marimow & Craig Timberg, Low-Level Federal Judges Balking at Law 
Enforcement Requests for Electronic Evidence, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2014), http://wapo.st/2l5r9lt 
[https://perma.cc/J36K-PCRU]. 
272. Id. 
273. In re United States, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 412–13. 
274. Id. at 413. 
275. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 614 (5th Cir. 2013). 
276. See In re Application of United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n 
Serv. to Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010) (“A cell phone customer has 
not ‘voluntarily’ shared his location information with a cellular provider in any meaningful way. As 
the EFF notes, it is unlikely that cell phone customers are aware that their cell phone providers 
collect and store historical location information.”). 
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would also systemically “contribute to ongoing case law”277 by making 
the public, legislatures, and courts aware of how surveillance authorities 
are interpreted and used. As one author points out, “[i]f more magistrates 
routinely published such decisions, the DOJ’s practical monopoly on 
information about how it uses (or abuses) its surveillance powers would 
be put to an end, and the ex parte expansion of government surveillance 
authority would be conclusively exposed.”278 Permitting public access to 
electronic surveillance orders can achieve the same ends without placing 
additional, onerous burdens on the federal judiciary. 
C. Improving the Criminal Justice Process 
Increased transparency for electronic surveillance applications and 
orders is also consonant with an emerging trend of increasing 
transparency for police departments plagued by misconduct. Sunlight as 
a remedy for misconduct is visible in settings as disparate as structural 
reform litigation and the policy debates about deployment of body 
cameras.279 Transparent, public filings in support of requests for court 
orders authorizing surveillance provide a crucial tether between police 
investigations, which necessarily occur in secret, and the public. In an 
era in which law enforcement increasingly stands accused of lacking 
“sufficient democratic authorization,”280 the closure of court records that 
authorize police to use intrusive investigative tools is a particularly 
troubling development. 
Public access may improve the criminal process for at least two 
reasons. First, making police aware that the public will—at some 
point—be able to read an affidavit offered in support of an application 
for surveillance may deter police misconduct and perjury. Barry 
Friedman and Oren Bar-Gill have argued that requiring ex ante search 
warrants, as a rule, may improve police decision making because police 
                                                 
277. Reid Day, Let the Magistrates Revolt: A Review of Search Warrant Applications for 
Electronic Information Possessed by Online Services, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 491, 520 (2015). 
278. Kevin S. Bankston, Only the DOJ Knows: The Secret Law of Electronic Surveillance, 41 
U.S.F. L. REV. 589, 590 (2007). 
279. See, e.g., Noah Kupferberg, Transparency: A New Role for Police Consent Decrees, 42 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 129, 160 (2008) (arguing that the chief value of police consent decrees 
is in “institutional transparency and the provision of information to the public”); Stephen Rushin, 
Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1396 (2015) 
(analyzing trends in structural litigation reform); Allyson Scher & Ariel Spierer, Policing Project to 
Assist LA: When to Release Body Camera Footage, POLICING PROJECT (Feb. 1, 2017), 
http://bit.ly/2lMUroT [https://perma.cc/38S5-ML8B] (describing pressures on police departments to 
release bodycam footage of police shootings). 
280. Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, supra note 23, at 1834. 
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are aware that their search requests will be scrutinized. Drawing on a 
significant body of social science research, Friedman and Bar-Gill argue, 
“the process of seeking a magistrate’s approval actually is likely to 
induce police officers to reach better decisions, either by forcing them to 
articulate reasons or by leading them to consider what the magistrate 
will do.”281 Friedman and Bar-Gill believe that police, “cognizant of the 
fact that their warrant applications will be scrutinized carefully, will not 
bother filing weak applications.”282 Public access bolsters this rationale: 
if applications for surveillance were subjected to scrutiny by the public, 
police may engage in more robust decision making when they seek the 
relatively low-cost tools available under the SCA and the Pen/Trap 
Statute. 
Electronic surveillance materials are doubly insulated from public 
view because, unlike traditional Rule 41 warrants, surveillance statutes 
provide no suppression remedy. While search warrants are “at the center 
of pre-trial suppression hearings, and suppression issues often determine 
the outcome of criminal prosecutions,”283 there is no suppression remedy 
for violations of the SCA or the Pen Register Statute.284 Every Circuit to 
have considered the issue has held that there is a First Amendment right 
of access to suppression hearings.285 Indeed, some of the important cases 
construing the government’s authority to obtain certain types of 
information under the SCA arise from suppression hearings.286 As a 
                                                 
281. Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1609, 
1642 (2012). 
282. Id. at 1640. 
283. In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 573 (8th 
Cir. 1988). 
284.  United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 358 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1548 
(2015) (“The Act has a narrow list of remedies, and—unlike the Wiretap Act, see 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2515—suppression is not among them.”); United States v. Rigmaiden, CR 08-814-PHX-DGC, 
2013 WL 1932800, at *10 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2013) (citing United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 
1056 (9th Cir. 1998)) (“Suppression is not an available remedy for violations of the SCA.”). 
285. United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 813 (10th Cir. 1997); In re Washington Post Co., 
807 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1986); Application of The Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 1984); 
United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1169–71 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Criden, 675 
F.2d 550, 557 (3d Cir. 1982); cf. In re United States ex rel. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 635 F.2d 676, 678 
(8th Cir. 1980) (remanding under Gannett for failure to make adequate findings justifying closure). 
286. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that 
“acquisition of historical CSLI from Defendants’ cell phone provider did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment,” and suppression was unwarranted); United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 890 
(6th Cir. 2016) (“[S]uppression of evidence is not among the remedies available under the Stored 
Communications Act.”); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 500 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 479 (2015) (holding that the government’s acquisition of historical cell tower information 
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result, it should be unambiguous that a First Amendment right of access 
attaches to electronic surveillance materials filed in connection with 
suppression hearings. But because exclusion—the traditional ex post 
remedy for Fourth Amendment violations—is unavailable in the 
electronic surveillance context, the public right of access to suppression 
hearings does not really help enhance public understanding of police 
practices. 
The potential for shaming provides another, far more traditional 
rationale for the functional benefits of transparency. In a recent article, 
Lara Bazelon discusses a specific type of “judicial shaming” that “occurs 
when the court takes the prosecutor to task during an oral argument for 
defending grave misconduct that led to a wrongful conviction.”287 
Shaming is a quintessentially “public sanction.”288 Noting that “[t]he 
second most common cause of wrongful convictions is official 
misconduct, trailing only false testimony,” Bazelon discusses how the 
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act stripped federal court 
judges of their ability to remedy wrongful convictions.289 In response, 
she argues, some federal courts are turning to public shaming as a 
remedy for egregious misconduct by prosecutors. Bazelon quotes Judge 
Kozinski, who echoed the First Amendment case law when he argued, 
“[j]udges who see bad behavior before them, especially prosecutors who 
wield great power and have greater ethical responsibilities, must hold the 
misconduct up to the light of public scrutiny.”290 Bazelon concludes that 
the efficacy of public shaming turns on the amount of “public exposure” 
misconduct receives. “Shaming sanctions require public condemnation. 
They require spectacle,” Bazelon writes.291 
Holding police individually accountable for misusing investigative 
tools comports with the history of the Fourth Amendment, as well. 
During the eighteenth century, targets of unlawful searches brought 
actions for trespass against the officers who had searched their homes.292 
                                                 
was not a search, and that suppression was therefore not required); In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site 
Data, 724 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 2013) (same). 
287. Lara Bazelon, For Shame: The Public Humiliation of Prosecutors by Judges to Correct 
Wrongful Convictions, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 305, 318 (2016). 
288. Id. 
289. Id. at 330. 
290. Id. at 351. 
291. Id. at 348. 
292. See, e.g., Cuddihy and Hardy, supra note 165, at 385 (1980) (describing trespass cases of 
Wilkes v. Wood and Huckle v. Money); Davies, supra note 163, at 588 (“Because a general warrant 
was clearly deemed illegal by the framing era, it did not protect either the issuing magistrate or the 
executing officer against trespass liability.”). 
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By cloaking electronic surveillance in secrecy, courts prevent observers 
from holding the government or its officers accountable for wrongdoing. 
But in the area of criminal justice, as the Supreme Court has 
admonished, public reporting and access to information “guards against 
the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and 
judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.”293 
D. Facilitating Democratic Accountability 
Access to information about electronic surveillance also plays a 
particularly positive role in the absence of congressional or judicial 
reporting of aggregate data concerning the use of surveillance 
authorities. As Paul Schwartz has put it, societal understanding of the 
scale of electronic surveillance is “largely precluded by the haphazard 
and incomplete information that the government collects about it.”294 
The paucity of data concerning warrantless electronic surveillance 
sets it apart from other kinds of law enforcement tools. The Pen/Trap 
Statute and the SCA lack provisions requiring judicial reporting on the 
number of times the authority is used each year.295 Under the Pen/Trap 
Statute, the Attorney General is required to submit annual reports to 
Congress on the Department of Justice’s use of the authority, but the 
Department has “routinely failed to submit the required reports.”296 In 
contrast, the Wiretap Act requires the Administrative Office of U.S. 
Courts to generate annual reports concerning data on interceptions of 
oral, wire, or electronic communications under Title III. Likewise, the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act requires annual reporting on the 
number of times the government applies to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court for an order authorizing foreign intelligence 
surveillance.297 Nor does the government publicly report, on an annual 
                                                 
293. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966). 
294. Paul M. Schwartz, Reviving Telecommunications Surveillance Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 287, 
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296. Naomi Gilens, New Justice Department Documents Show Huge Increase in  
Warrantless Electronic Surveillance, ACLU (Sept. 27, 2012, 1:32 PM), http://bit.ly/2kQc0pF 
[https://perma.cc/3EHG-FJD5]. The Stored Communications Act lacks any congressional reporting 
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basis or otherwise, the number of gag orders it obtains each year to 
prevent service providers from disclosing the number of requests.298 In 
the absence of any kind of comparable data source, public access to 
electronic surveillance applications and orders, at a minimum, may give 
the public a sense of the frequency with which the SCA and the 
Pen/Trap Statute are used. 
IV. COMPELLING NEEDS FOR SECRECY? 
If the right of access attaches, the First Amendment requires judicial 
documents to be unsealed unless the government establishes a 
“compelling need” for secrecy and shows that sealing is narrowly 
tailored. How might the right of access be applied to statutes that require 
or authorize sealing without any factual findings, let alone the 
demanding showing required under Press-Enterprise II? 
That the First Amendment standard can only be satisfied by fact-
specific showings counsels strongly against statutory standards that 
create blanket invitations to secrecy. As a general rule, courts must make 
“specific findings” on the record to demonstrate that the right of access 
has been overcome.299 In ongoing investigations, it should be easy for 
law enforcement to demonstrate that there is a compelling need for 
secrecy of surveillance materials.300 When an investigation is ongoing, 
public access to surveillance documents is likely to play a negative role 
by potentially alerting targets that they are under surveillance. 
Nonetheless, the need for secrecy during investigations does not 
require that the documents filed in connection with those proceedings 
never see the light of day. To the contrary, courts routinely find that 
justifications for closure erode over time: even where proceedings are 
properly closed, the First Amendment may require that a transcript be 
published “once the danger of prejudice . . . dissipate[s].”301 When courts 
grant sealing orders, they may incorporate sunset provisions or 
requirements that the government inform the court if the “conditions for 
                                                 
orders and extensions of orders approving electronic surveillance under this subchapter; and (b) the 
total number of such orders and extensions either granted, modified, or denied”).  
298. See In re Nat’l Sec. Letter, 930 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (nondisclosure 
order accompanies ninety-seven percent of NSLs). 
299. See Washington Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (following Second, 
Fourth and Ninth Circuits in requiring courts to make “specific findings . . . on the record” to justify 
sealing plea agreements). 
300. In re U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(d), 707 F.3d 283, 292 (4th Cir. 
2013). 
301. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 393 (1979). 
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unsealing” occur.302 Even grand-jury materials, which are inarguably 
subject to exceptionally strong secrecy requirements, might someday 
become public.303 
The effect of blanket secrecy requirements like those in the Pen/Trap 
Statute is to categorically and indefinitely shield records long after any 
interest in secrecy, no matter how compelling, has dissipated. These 
secrecy requirements ignore that facts change. Where a criminal 
investigation has come to an end—whether it results in an indictment or 
no judicial action at all—there is no obvious government interest in 
secrecy sufficiently compelling to justify sealing tens of thousands of 
judicial documents. Once an investigation is concluded, the right of 
access can shine a light on law enforcement activity that may otherwise 
remain secret indefinitely. Applying the constitutional test to electronic 
surveillance orders strongly suggests that the First Amendment right of 
access should attach to electronic surveillance applications and orders 
after an investigation has terminated. 
Now, several cases are challenging the long-term, unjustified sealing 
of pen registers and other electronic surveillance applications and orders. 
In recent litigation in the District of Columbia, a journalist sought access 
to each application, affidavit, and court order under the Pen/Trap Statute 
and the SCA.304 In response, the government published a list of the 
docket information for pen registers and trap-and-trace orders issued in 
2012—a total of 235 matters—and proposed that only 10% of the 
matters ought to be unsealed in whole or in part.305 While the court 
ultimately concluded that a First Amendment right of access did not 
attach to the records sought, it did recognize that the public had a 
common law right that required the clerk’s office and the prosecutor’s 
office to publish additional information concerning surveillance 
applications and orders.306 Ongoing litigation in the Northern District of 
                                                 
302. United States v. Dwyer, 629 F. App’x 85 (2d Cir. 2015); see also T. S. Ellis, III, Sealing, 
Judicial Transparency and Judicial Independence, 53 VILL. L. REV. 939, 949 (2008) (“[E]very 
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303. Carlson v. United States, 837 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that district courts 
retain discretion to disclose historical grand jury materials). 
304. Petition, In re The Application of Jason Leopold to Unseal Certain Electronic Surveillance 
Applications and Orders, No. 1:13-mc-00712-BAH (D.D.C. July 16, 2013), ECF No. 1.  
305. Fourth Joint Status Report, In re The Application of Jason Leopold (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2017), 
ECF No. 28. 
306. In re Leopold to Unseal Certain Elec. Surveillance Applications & Orders, No. 13-MC-
00712, 2018 WL 1129660, at *32 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2018) (recognizing a prospective right of access 
under the common law). 
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California is also seeking docketing and unsealing of court records 
related to matters arising under the Wiretap Act, the SCA, and the 
Pen/Trap Statute.307 
A second proposed justification for secrecy stems from concerns 
about the individual privacy of those who are targeted. Communications 
surveillance records might be particularly sensitive and revelatory, and 
access to documents pertaining to surveillance may invade individual 
privacy. Many have noted that even “transactional” records related to 
communication can disclose highly sensitive information related to 
political, religious and expressive associations,308 eroding the contested 
boundary between “content” and “metadata.”309 Because surveillance 
orders do not require probable cause, many targets of surveillance may 
not even be criminal suspects. 
Others have noted that public access to pretrial judicial documents 
may be particularly invasive in cases in which charges against an 
individual are dropped, or the defendant is ultimately acquitted: 
[E]ven in cases where charges were wrongfully brought—a case 
of mistaken identity, perhaps, or simply a misunderstanding—
the record of that individual’s history in the criminal justice 
system will remain. Rarely will this record note that the charges 
were dismissed, or that the individual was found to be 
innocent.310 
One recent disclosure is instructive. In May 2012, the Associated 
Press and other news organizations published an article concerning a 
                                                 
307. See discussion supra at notes 17–19. In an earlier case seeking access to historical 
applications and orders under the Pen/Trap Statute, a federal court ruled in a minute order that the 
documents at issue “are not subject to the First Amendment Right of Access,” apparently on the 
basis that an investigation was ongoing. United States v. Pen Register, No. 2:10-mj-01235 (S.D. 
Tex. June 4, 2015). In the one case in which the United States did not oppose the unsealing, the 
Court determined that the Wall Street Journal’s motion to gain access was moot. Sealed Matter, No. 
2:07-mc-127 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2015); see also Brian L. Owsley, To Unseal or Not to Unseal: The 
Judiciary’s Role in Preventing Transparency in Electronic Surveillance Applications and Orders, 5 
CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 259 (2014). 
308. Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First Amendment 
Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 744 (2008) (“Current legal doctrine, 
which centers on ‘privacy’ and hence on protecting the content of communications, does not 
adequately account for the extent to which relational surveillance threatens to chill expressive 
association in today’s networked world.”). 
309. See, e.g., Freiwald, supra note 210, at 70 (arguing that the binary content-metadata 
distinction has “dire consequences for privacy on the Internet”); Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of 
Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1453 (calling for the “abandonment” of the 
“envelope analogy” that calls for leaving metadata unprotected). 
310. Amanda Conley et al., Sustaining Privacy and Open Justice in the Transition to Online 
Court Records: A Multidisciplinary Inquiry, 71 MD. L. REV. 772, 783–84 (2012). 
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disrupted terrorist plot to use an upgraded “underwear bomb” on an 
aircraft.311 After the Associated Press published its story, the government 
confirmed the account.312 The FBI then opened a leak investigation of 
the disclosure, which implicated sensitive and classified national 
security information.313 In the course of investigating, the FBI secretly 
subpoenaed two months of telephone records from the Associated 
Press.314 After receiving the records, the FBI then applied for an SCA 
order compelling Google to turn over email records belonging to one of 
the reporters.315 
The subpoenas became public less than a week later, and the leaker in 
that case—Donald Sachtleben—pleaded guilty in September 2013.316 
But the application for the reporter’s email records remained under seal 
until September 2017, when the Reporters Committee for Freedom of 
the Press successfully moved to unseal it. Although the reporter’s name 
and the name of the publication are redacted, there are more than enough 
details in the records to reconstruct the identities of both. Indeed, if this 
episode were not already public, this form of disclosure could raise 
substantial privacy concerns. But the fact that the records remained 
sealed even after the investigation was made public and had been closed 
for four years simply illustrates the overbreadth of the secrecy 
requirement. 
Publicizing surveillance-related court records, therefore, is not 
without its drawbacks as a policy matter. But the fact that surveillance 
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materials in individual cases may implicate individual privacy rights 
does not mean that there is no history or logic of access to those 
materials. As the Fourth Amendment history illustrates, the public has 
long had access to information about the execution of searches—
information that was critical to understanding how and when 
government searches were abusive and unconstitutional. Implicit in this 
history is the idea that the Fourth Amendment’s protections are 
endangered when searches are executed in secret. As the Second Circuit 
noted when articulating the need for safeguards for “sneak and peek” 
searches, secret searches increase the risk that “officers will exceed the 
bounds of propriety without detection.”317 
In specific cases, individual privacy interests might well involve a 
compelling need for secrecy that could outweigh the public’s right of 
access to surveillance materials. Courts can address this by applying the 
constitutional standard for closure of court records. Nor is this an all-or-
none project: courts can also use traditional, narrowly tailored methods 
of safeguarding privacy in public records, such as the use of redactions 
to anonymize the identifying details of innocent surveillance targets. 
Critically, however, the First Amendment demands that judges make 
these determinations on the facts of specific cases, not on the basis of 
general principles. 
More to the point, this argument raises a graver issue that lies at the 
very core of the need for increased transparency and public oversight of 
surveillance. It is a matter of the utmost public concern if law 
enforcement is routinely targeting innocent individuals for secret 
surveillance without notice. The government invades those individuals’ 
privacy when they are targeted for surveillance, not only when it is later 
exposed. Efforts to shield that surveillance from view tend to preserve 
what Patrick Toomey and Brett Max Kaufman called the “notice 
paradox”: “the people the government deprives of notice will never 
know that it chose not to provide notice to them.”318 The position is akin 
to New York City’s defense of its programmatic surveillance of Muslims 
after September 11: the plaintiffs who were under surveillance were 
injured, not by the surveillance itself, but by the Associated Press’s 
reporting of the program. This absurdist stance, as the Third Circuit 
aptly described it, amounts to: “[w]hat you don’t know can’t hurt you. 
And, if you do know, don’t shoot us. Shoot the messenger.”319 Put 
                                                 
317. United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1336 (2d Cir. 1990). 
318. Toomey & Kaufman, supra note 22, at 848. 
319. Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 292 (3d Cir. 2015). 
Bloch-Wehba (Ready to Pub) 3/26/2018  11:06 AM 
2018] EXPOSING SECRET SEARCHES 199 
 
another way, the government should not be able to secretly surveil 
innocent people and then avoid scrutiny by asserting that revealing the 
government’s privacy-invasive activity would infringe on their privacy. 
CONCLUSION 
Widespread sealing and secret docketing practices for materials 
related to the SCA and pen register/trap and trace orders obscure key 
data about law enforcement’s use of surveillance, including legal 
interpretations. Recognizing that a First Amendment right of access 
attaches to these materials would not, however, open all of them to 
immediate scrutiny. A right of access that attaches after an investigation 
has concluded would not jeopardize law enforcement techniques or the 
integrity of the ex parte proceedings seeking surveillance. Far from it—
some additional sunshine in this dimly lit area would not only have a 
salutary effect on surveillance and policing, but it is also consonant with 
historical practice, as the First Amendment requires. And in truly 
compelling circumstances, the First Amendment right of access might 
yield to law enforcement’s compelling interest in secrecy, even after an 
investigation has ended, to keep the materials under seal. 
In other words, courts should treat surveillance orders like other court 
records under the First Amendment. Applying these generally held 
principles of constitutional law to surveillance orders would rectify the 
unexplained disparity that exists between access to surveillance orders 
and access to other documents filed in connection with pretrial criminal 
proceedings. 
 
